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31  Introduction
The Moroccan  economy  grew at a yearly  average rate  of 3.5 percent  during
the period  1983-92 and  3.1  percent  during  1993-2001,  despite  a high degree
of output volatility  (particularly  in the agricultural  sector).  However,  rapid
population growth limited income gains in per capita terms to yearly averages
of only 1.4 percent during the 1980s  and to negligible rates during the 1990s.
Moreover,  the sharp increase  in  the labor  force  induced  by  greater  partici-
pation rates  (at about  2.5 percent  per annum during the past two decades),
combined  with low output growth rates,  led to high rates of unemployment
in urban areas and underemployment  in the rural sector  (see Figure  1).
Concerns  over the insufficient pace of job creation has led many observers
to recommend  the  implementation  of  a series  of structural  reforms  aimed
at  accelerating  the rate of economic  growth.  Of particular  interest  in this
context  has  been  the potential  impact  of various  kinds of labor  market  re-
forms  on  employment  and  resource  allocation.  The  purpose  of this  paper
is  to develop  a quantitative  macroeconomic  framework  that can  be used to
analyze the impact  of various types of labor market reforms on employment,
wages,  and economic  growth  in  Morocco.  Our point  of departure  is that  a
key  condition  for the design of growth-enhancing  policies is a proper  under-
standing  of the  functioning  of the labor  market,  particularly  in  the  urban
sector.  Indeed,  it has long  been  recognized  that  the labor  market  is  a key
determinant  of individual welfare in developing  countries.  It has a direct in-
fluence on household resources,  because the poor derive the majority of their
monetary income from selling their  work  force.  In  addition,  the labor mar-
ket is an important  channel in the transmission  process  of exogenous  shocks
and adjustment policies-both macroeconomic  and structural-on economic
activity,  employment,  relative  prices,  and resource  allocation.  For  instance,
labor  market  segmentation  plays  a key  role  in shaping  the  effects  of labor
market  reforms  on resource  allocation.  Indeed,  in the presence  of a low  de-
gree of worker  mobility,  a segmented  labor  market  contributes  to persistent
wage  differentials  that  may hinder  the resource  allocation  indispensable  to
cope with external  and policy-induced  shocks.  In addition  to labor  market
segmentation and imperfect labor mobility, it is important to account for the
heterogeneity  of the  labor  force  and the  specific  nature  of wage  formation
within  sectors.  These  considerations  apply  most significantly  to the  urban
labor market, given that the rural labor market in developing countries  func-
tions more like a competitive market.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an
overview of the Moroccan labor market.  It also explains the main constraints
affecting the labor market, and identifies some of the challenges that Morocco
will  continue to  face  in  the  coming  years.  Section  III presents  a quantita-
tive  framework  to  analyze  the  effects  of  various  labor  market  reforms  on
growth,  employment,  and wages.  The framework  developed  in  this  paper
is based on the IMMPA  model  developed  by Agenor,  Izquierdo,  and Fofack
(2003),  and Agenor,  Fernandes,  Haddad,  and van der  Mensbrugghe  (2003).'
However,  the version  developed here  differs  in several  important  ways from
those described in these other papers,  in order to reflect the country's  insti-
tutional specificities  and the type of policy issues  that we want  to address.
First,  we  allow  for  open unskilled  urban  unemployment,  by  introducing  a
Harris-Todaro  type  mechanism  to determine  the supply  of  unskilled  labor
in the  formal  sector.  This  extension  is  very important  for  Morocco,  where
unskilled  unemployment  accounts  for  a large  fraction  of total open  unem-
ployment.  Second,  we  use a monopoly  union  approach to determine  skilled
workers'  wage in the private formal sector that accounts for the effect of firing
costs,  open unemployment,  and a signaling role of public sector wages on the
union's target wage.  This setup leads  to a wage equation in which there is a
level effect of unemployment  on wages,  as predicted by various forms of effi-
ciency wage  theories  (such  as  those emphasizing  the wage-productivity  link
or turnover  costs,  a bargaining  framework  between  firms  and  a centralized
trade  union,  or  a negative  effect  of unemployment  on workers'  reservation
wage).  Third,  we  assume  that nominal  wages  are fully  flexible in  both the
traded  and nontraded  agricultural  sector  and  adjust  continuously  to equili-
brate  the supply and demand  for  labor in the rural  labor  market.  Fourth,
wages in the public sector are treated as exogenous and we assume that there
exists a non-pecuniary  benefit  (in terms  of, say,  increased job security)  that
leads  to zero turnover  for that category of workers-even  in the presence  of
higher  wages  for that  category  of labor  in the private  sector.  Fifth,  in or-
der to analyze the  impact  of changes  in the taxation  of firms'  wage  bill on
employment,  we  introduce  payroll  taxation  on the  use  of both skilled  and
unskilled  labor in the private urban formal sector.  The extent to which high
1Various computable general equilibrium  (CGE)  models have been built for Morocco  in
the recent  past;  these include Cogneau  and  Tapinos  (1995),  Lofgren  (1999),  and Ruther-
ford, Rustrom,  and Tarr (1994).  None of these models, however,  addresses the set of issues
discussed  in this paper.
5payroll  taxes have tended to discourage the demand  for labor  (particularly
unskilled  labor)  has been an important  policy issue in Morocco.  Our frame-
work allows us to consider the general implications of changes in these taxes,
and the  various channels  through which  they affect employment,  as well  as
possible  complementarities  between  labor  market  policies  and tax  reform.
Finally,  we  account  for  congestion  effects  associated  with the use  of public
sector capital in the urban sector.
Section IV presents simulation experiments focusing on a cut in the min-
imum wage  and a reduction  in payroll taxation  on unskilled  labor.  In both
cases, we focus on the behavior of wages across sectors, the demand for labor,
and unemployment.  Section  V summarizes  the main results of the analysis.
We highlight,  in particular,  the need to extend the set of policy simulations
to consider  the impact  of various  "closure rules"  for the government  budget
(that is,  offsetting  changes in taxes),  reductions in firing costs, public  sector
layoffs  (possibly coupled with an increase in employment subsidies to private,
formal  sector firms),  changes in bargaining strength between  unions and em-
ployers,  and the effects  of changes  in the composition  of public expenditure
(that is,  the allocation  between  investment in infrastructure,  education,  and
health)  on growth  and employment.
2  The Labor Market  in Morocco
This  section  presents  an overview  of the  labor  market  in  Morocco.  First,
we present  its basic structural  features and the degree of segmentation,  with
a focus on the  role of the  informal sector.  Second,  we examine  the  overall
composition of the labor force  (including  public employment),  the structure
of unemployment,  and the  returns  to education.  Third,  we  review regula-
tory and institutional characteristics of the labor market, including  minimum
wage legislation,  hiring and firing restrictions,  nonwage labor costs,  and the
role of trade unions.  Fourth, we examine some  of the evidence on wage flex-
ibility.  Fifth,  we  discuss  factors  affecting  domestic  and international  labor
migration.  Finally,  we highlight  some of the constraints  and  challenges that
the labor market poses to policymakers  in Morocco.
62.1  Basic Structure
The urban labor market in developing  economies is generally well  described
as consisting of two sectors,  a formal and an informal one, with distinct func-
tioning modes.  The segmentation hypothesis  has important implications  for
the functioning  of the labor  market.  For  instance,  high pay  formal  sector
jobs  are  often  rationed  and,  despite  an  excess  supply  of  labor  in  the low
pay informal sector,  wages  do not  adjust.  Note that many studies  have also
suggested that the two segments  are highly heterogeneous-in  the nature of
occupations,  in the  production  mode,  in the sources  of income,  and  so  on.
The view that the informal sector is  competitive has received mixed support
from the empirical  evidence.  In fact, in some countries  many activities  clas-
sified  in the  informal sector  present  barriers  to entry.  For instance,  access
can be conditioned by customs practices and relatively strict unwritten rules.
This  appears to be the case for  many crafting activities  in Morocco.
Despite the lack of comprehensive  micro-level  data on enterprises  at the
national  level,  the  common  view  of Morocco's -urban labor market  is  that
of a  dual segmented  market.  Within  this  framework,  there have  been  at-
tempts to  measure  the  respective  size  of the  two  segments.  For  instance,
the  civil  servants  (central  government  and  local  governments),  workers  in
public  enterprises  and those  covered  by the  social security  scheme  (CNSS)
constitute  the  formal sector.  The  informal  sector  corresponds  then  to the
residual.2 Other  studies  have  shown that  the  Moroccan  urban  labor  mar-
ket  is  highly segmented,  and  that its  functioning  is  far from  competitive. 3
Non-compensating  wage  differentials  between  workers  with similar  produc-
tive  endowments  are  pervasive:  higher  gains  are  frequently  observed  when
workers  (even unskilled  ones) are located in particular  segments.  In fact, de-
spite the existence  of excess  labor supply,  wages in the formal sector  do not
adjust,  and the informal  sector is  not absorbing  all the job seekers.  Within
this context of restricted labor mobility  and specific participation dynamics,
the sector of occupation  is a key determinant of an individual's remuneration
and standard  of living.  Moreover,  surveys  show that private  firms  are will-
ing to pay a premium-as  suggested  by efficiency  wage theories-to secure
workers'  commitment.
2See,  for instance,  Belghazi  (1998)  and  Touhami  (2003).
3Empirical  tests  by  El  Aynaoui  (1998)  confirm  the  prevalence  of  the  segmentation
hypothesis.
72.2  Employment,  Unemployment,  and the Returns to
Education
The  first  part  of our  review  of the  characteristics  of  the  labor  market  in
Morocco  focuses on the sectoral distribution of the workforce,  the structure
of public employment,  the composition  of unemployment,  and the returns to
education.
2.2.1  Sectoral  distribution of the workforce
In Morocco,  a sizable  share  of the workforce  (around  55  percent  in  2000)
remains  employed  in the agricultural  sector.  This  proportion  is  quite  high
compared  to around  35  percent  for  lower  middle-income  countries.  At the
same time,  women still account for  only 22 percent  of the total urban work-
force.  Data on the occupational distribution of the workforce  in urban areas
show that wage employment is dominant, followed by self-employment.  Panel
6 in Figure  3 displays the distribution of the workforce  by occupational  sta-
tus for  2000.  It shows that wage  earners accounted  for  about  61 percent  of
total employment,  and self employment  for  about  24  percent.  Most  of the
wage  earners  are employed  in the  private  urban sector,  though public  sec-
tor employment  (central government,  local communities,  public  enterprises)
also accounts  for a large proportion  (around  19.5 percent).  The rest of the
workers  are  non remunerated  aid-families,  apprentices,  employers  or  home
workers.  The average  educational  level  of the work force  is rather  low,  with
55 percent not holding  any degree in  2000.
The  evidence  for  developing  countries  in general  suggests that  contrac-
tions of available opportunities in salaried occupations tend to drive workers
toward self employment.  In Morocco,  the data seem also to suggest that the
share of self employment  in total urban employment tends to rise when wage
employment  decreases.  However,  during the  1990s  (a decade  marked  by  a
weak growth performance,  as noted earlier),  self employment  did not signif-
icantly  increase,  remaining  at around  24 percent  of total employment.  Al-
though some observers have argued that the urban labor market  in Morocco
has  undergone  a  process  of  "informalization",  this argument  is  debatable.
If we  simply  define  "informalization"  as  a reduction  in  the  share  of wage
employment  in total  employment,  it is  not  obvious  that there  has  been  a
growing  informalization  of the urban labor market.  Indeed,  even if there are
marked fluctuations  on a yearly  basis, wage employment  is by far the major
8type of occupation in Morocco.  Its share has not dramatically decreased over
the  1990s.  The lowest  value  is  59.3  percent  of the  total workforce  in  1993
(see Panel  5,  Figure 3).
2.2.2  Public  sector employment
The public sector (central government, municipalities,  and public enterprises)
plays an important role in Morocco.  It represented around  18 percent of Mo-
rocco's  GDP  in  2000.  With about  635,000  employees  (central  government
excluding the military, and employees of municipalities),  equivalent to 15 per-
cent of total urban employment-or  19.5 percent  if we add public enterprises.
As a result,  wage  policy in the public sector has important  consequences  on
the functioning of the labor market.  A recent study by the World Bank (2002)
found that monetary compensation  are 8 percent higher in the public sector
than in the private sector.  If we were to include non-pecuniary compensation,
such  as job security,  a  generous  pensions  fund,  and a higher  shirking rate,
then the divergence  between  private and public sector wages  would be even
larger.  Using the living standard  measurement  survey for  1998-99  to  assess
the  value of such non-pecuniary  compensation  suggests that  these features
are on  average  equivalent  to  60-100  percent  of the  monetary remuneration.
This implies that for a corresponding  nominal  remuneration,  a civil servant
will  get a global wage between  1.5 and two times higher than what he would
obtain in the private sector.  This outcome may explain the significant queues
for  employment in the public sector,  particularly  by skilled workers.
2.2.3  Unemployment
As  in many  developing countries,  in Morocco  open unemployment  is essen-
tially  an urban  phenomenon  (see  Panels  4 and  5,  Figure  2).  In  2000,  the
urban  unemployment  rate  stood  at  21.4  percent,  against  15.8  percent  in
1990.  This is equivalent,  in 2000, to 1.1  million unemployed out of an active
population of 5.4 million.  Several facts reveal important tensions  on the do-
mestic labor market.  The youth (15-24 years old)  are particularly vulnerable
to unemployment  in  urban  areas,  with  a rate  often  well  above  30  percent
since  the'early  1990s  (see  Panel  4,  Figure  3).  Whereas  the unemployment
rate  for  individuals  with  no  instruction  is  somewhat  low  (12.2  percent  in
2000)  and fluctuates  significantly  in conjunction with economic  activity,  the
unemployment  rate is persistently  high for  individuals  with a higher level  of
9education.  In 2000, their  unemployment  rate was 30.7 percent.  Gender dif-
ferences  are also quite striking:  in 2000,  26.7 percent of active urban women
were unemployed,  compared to only 19.9  percent  of the men.
Turning now to the composition  of unemployment,  the data reveal  that
the  15-24  year  old  group  and  individuals  with  a higher  level  of  education
account  for around  37  percent  and  more  than 18 percent  of the number  of
job seekers,  respectively,  in  2000.  Individuals with no education represented
8  percent  of the  unemployed  population  that  year.  Underemployment  is
pervasive,  indicating  that unemployment  may well  be worse than the data
suggest:  in  1991,  it  affected  20 percent  of the urban workforce,  and,  for the
under-25  group,  the  rate  of underemployment  was  34.5  percent.  In  1995,
this rate was 24.2  percent and 23.3 percent  for the 15-24  and the 25-34  year
old groups,  respectively.  Overall,  movements  in the  unemployment  rate are
highly  correlated  with fluctuations  in  GDP.  For  instance,  in  1995,  a  year
marked by a severe drought, urban unemployment reached  22.9 percent,  and
the strong subsequent  recovery  in  1996,  in which GDP grew  by  12  percent,
allowed to reduce it by about  5 percentage  points.
Additional  elements  reveal  several  features  of urban  unemployment  in
Morocco.  As in many developing countries,  the majority (about 54.5 percent)
of the  unemployed  are  first-time job  seekers.  Among  the unemployed,  the
impact of long-term  unemployment  is  pervasive:  in 2000,  around  75 percent
of job seekers  were searching  for a job for more than 12  months.  Moreover,
the educational  level does not  appear to reduce significantly  the probability
of staying unemployed.  Indeed,  if we only consider individuals with a higher
level  of education,  around  85 percent  had  been searching  for  a job  for  over
a year.  More  generally,  in  2000, the  average duration of unemployment  was
41  months.
An  analysis  of the job  search  patterns  of the  unemployed  reveals  spe-
cific characteristics.  A great majority of the unemployed  (about  two-thirds)
searches  through personal contacts.  A targeted study on cohorts  of students
from  vocational  institutes  also  found  that personal  relations  play  a crucial
role in finding  a job in the private sector  (see Montmarquette  et al.  (1996)).
Only 9 percent of the unemployed are using formal strategies  (such as written
inquiries  or responses to job openings).  Hence,  personal relations appears to
be the most efficient  way to find a job in Morocco.  Within a context  of tight
hiring and firing regulations  (as discussed below),  the reliance on personal re-
lations may also be a way for the employers  to minimize, through maximum
information on the candidate,  the risks associated  with hiring.
10What  type of jobs are the unemployed  favoring?  According  to available
surveys,  more than 80 percent  of the unemployed are searching  for a salaried
occupation.  In  fact,  only  a marginal  portion of them  is willing to start  an
independent  activity.  Skilled  workers  usually  prefer to  remain  unemployed
rather than accept  a job in the informal sector  (mostly due to the impact of
the family environment on luxury unemployment)  or go into self-employment.
Thus, the fact that around 36 percent of the urban poor job seekers are ready
to  accept  any  occupation,  against  less  than  15  percent  of their  non-poor
counterparts,  is a sign of their vulnerability.
In urban areas, the rate of unemployment  for the poor is about 50 percent
higher than the overall rate of unemployment.  Overall,  the insertion on the
labor  market  is a key determinant  of the living standards.  The dependency
ratio-calculated  as  the ratio of the unemployed  to the employed  members
of a household-is  50 percent  higher for poor  families.  Along the same line,
econometric  estimates  indicate  that,  ceteris  paribus,  unemployment  signifi-
cantly  increases the probability  of being poor  (see El Aynaoui  (1998)).  The
link between  labor market  functioning  and poverty  is a strong  argument  in
favor  of labor market reform  to address segmentation and unemployment.
2.2.4  Returns on Education
Globally, the few available studies assessing the impact of educational attain-
ments on earnings  are showing the usual  positive influence.  Experience  also
shapes  the educational returns-there  is  a quadratic effect.  Estimations  of
earning functions for wage earners at the national and regional levels indicate
that private marginal returns of investment in education  is around 10 percent
per each additional year of education  (see Touhami  (2003),  and Cherkaoui et
al.  (2002)).  Returns  of education  are higher for females  and in urban  areas.
However,  the returns  of educational  achievements  are rather different  when
controlling for the segmentation hypothesis  (El Aynaoui  (1998)).  In fact,  an
actual  effect  is  only observed  in the  formal  sector while the  private returns
of education  are not  significant  in the informal  sector.  This  outcome might
preclude  investment  incentives  in human capital,  specifically  within  partic-
ular  categories  of individual  who,  as evoked  earlier,  may not have access  to
the formal sector.2.3  Regulatory and Institutional Features
Regulatory  and  institutional  features  of the labor market  in  Morocco  that
are important  for understanding wage and employment formation include the
minimum wage,  hiring and firing regulations,  the matching process between
supply and demand  for labor, the structure of nonwage labor costs, and the
role of trade unions.
2.3.1  Minimum Wage  Regulation
Morocco  adopted as early as  1936  a minimum wage legislation that sets dif-
ferent  wages  floors  for  urban  and rural labor  markets,  and for different  age
categories.  Minimum  wages  are revised according  to a formal price indexa-
tion mechanism,  namely  as soon  as the consumer price index increases  by  5
percent.  In practice,  however, revisions  are irregular  and rather independent
of the  indexation  rule.  In  fact,  they  are  usually  the outcome  of political
and discretionary  decisions,  following overwhelming  pressure from the trade
unions.  The few available studies reveal that the urban minimum wage reg-
ulation  (which  concerns mostly unskilled  workers)  is pretty  well enforced  in
the private  formal sector,  through  an active  role of the administration  and
the trade unions.  According to Benhayoun  et al.  (2001),  only  13 percent  of
the wage earners in the private formal sector are unfairly paid a salary lower
than the minimum wage.
During the period  1970-2000,  the nominal  urban minimum  wage has  in-
creased  by  an  average  of 6 percent  a  year  (see  Panels  1 and  4,  Figure  2).
In real  terms,  the urban minimum  wage fluctuates,  though slightly,  due to
the  ad hoc  nature of the revision  process.  Over the  period  1970-2000,  the
real urban minimum wage rose on average by around 1.1  percent every year.
Over  the  1990s  only,  it  has  increased  by  around  1.3  percent,  a rate  faster
than the rate of growth of labor productivity  in the industrial formal private
sector.  These  increases  adversely  affected  the  demand  for unskilled  labor,
and  contributed  to  a rise  in  Morocco's  unit  labor  costs,  thereby  affecting
Morocco's  external  competitiveness.
The urban minimum  wage represents  50  percent  of the  average  wage  in
the formal private sector and 178 percent  of GDP per capita in 2000-a fairly
high level  in comparison  to other  developing  countries.  Benhayoun  and  alii
(2001)  have found that minimum wage legislation influences,  though weakly,
the  overall  wage  structure  in  the  private  formal  sector.  Their  study  also
12found that increases  in the minimum wage tend to reduce wage inequality in
the short term, but that this effect  is rather limited in the long term due to a
diffusion effect to the whole wage structure.  Other estimates at the firm level
in the formal private sector (Mouime  (2001))  have found that an increase in
the minimum wage raises the average wage over time.  More  specifically,  the
short and long-term elasticities  are lower  than one and superior  to one,  re-
spectively.  Azam  (1995)  failed  to demonstrate  empirically  that the  urban
minimum wage has a direct effect  on the level of employment,  but concluded
that it affects  the level of employment via the wedge between the minimum
wage  and the  average  wage  paid  in the private  formal  sector.  Benhayoun
et  al.  (2001)  also found  that the  urban  minimum  wage  has a tendency  to
deter job creation in the formal  sector.  Here,  a major source  of concern  for
policymakers  is to assess whether  the minimum wage deters  formal job cre-
ation (particularly  for low-skilled  workers)  by introducing downward rigidity
in real wages.  As discussed below, this is an important issue in assessing the
impact  of labor market reforms in Morocco.
2.3.2  Hiring and Firing Regulations
Morocco  has comprehensive  and rather restrictive labor  market regulations,
particularly regarding firing procedures for the private sector workforce.  There
regulations are well enforced, through an active role of the administration  and
the trade unions.  For instance,  individual  layoffs  for  economic  purposes  are
prohibited.  Moreover,  downsizing for economic reasons is subject to prior ap-
proval by the regional  authorities.  The only way  for an employer  to dismiss
a worker  is for disciplinary matters.  Even then, the law opens the possibility
for a dismissed worker to lodge  an appeal before the court which will exam-
ine the employer  decision.  The procedure  is so complicated that  firms seek
to avoid it through often  costly direct  agreements  with the laid  off worker,
not to  face  long judicial  procedures.  In fact,  more than  in its rigidity,  the
main flaw of the current legal  framework  resides in the unpredictability  and
inconsistency of the jurisprudence over time and across space that stem from
the important leeway the law grants to the courts.
This  constraining  labor  market  framework  hinders labor  demand.  The
judicial practice further strengthens permanent  workers'  job security,  giving
insiders a substantial  bargaining power,  and leaving  outsiders  clearly  disad-
vantaged.  Also,  the difficulties  involved in firing workers,  and the potential
financial  cost that  firing can  imply,  partly  explain  why employers  are  usu-
13ally reluctant  to  hire  new workers  and  why they  rely  mainly  on personal
relationships  to do  so,  as  shown  by some  available  studies  (CNJA  (1995),
Montmarquette  et  al.  (1996))  and  as  noted  earlier.  Through personal  con-
tacts,  employers  minimize  the  risk related to hiring  by  gathering  complete
information  on the worker.  Knowing the candidate  also  increases  the likeli-
hood that  they will  be able  to exercise  social  pressures  to  negotiate  better
terms  for  his/hers  eventual  firing.  Globally,  nonetheless,  this legal  frame-
work constrains  the capacity of enterprises  to adapt to changes in economic
activity  and relative  price  incentives,  and encourages  temporary  contracts.
The very  nature  of these  contracts  prevents  significant  gains  in productiv-
ity, because they dissuade firms from investing in the human capital of their
workforce.
2.3.3  Institutional Job Matching Processes
Formally,  the job matching  process  is  a public  monopoly.  The  country has
recently  adopted  a  set of  active  labor  market  policies  aimed at  improving
the job matching  process  for young  skilled  workers.  This policy  is  mainly
based  on  regional  public  institutions  in charge  of improving  the  matching
process  between  labor demand  and young  skilled labor  supply,  and  specific
labor  tax deductions  favoring  their  employment.  A  study  by  Ibourk  and
Perelman  (1999) shows that these institutions tend to improve the efficiency
of the job matching process,  but that they are limited in their action by the
gap between  labor demand and labor supply.
2.3.4  Nonwage  Labor Costs
In  addition  to  minimum  wage  regulation  and  firing  legislation,  there  are
numerous  compulsory  social  contributions  that also affect  the private labor
demand  function.  In  the  private  formal  industrial  sector,  besides  income
taxes,4  nonwage  labor  costs  represent  around  24  percent  of the total  costs
of the labor  force.  Hence,  for a worker in the private  formal sector,  there is
a substantial  wedge between the gross wage and the net income.  According
to the current  regulatory  framework,  employers  pay around  18.6  percent  of
the gross  wage to the  Social  Security  (CNSS)  for pension contributions  and
other social  coverages.  There  is  also  a  1.6  percent  compulsory  tax  on the
4Income  tax rates  range  from  13  percent  to 44 percent.  Social contributions  are  de-
ductible  from the tax base.
14overall wage  bill of every  enterprise,  exclusively  to contribute to the budget
of the public vocational training system.  Besides, the employer  is responsible
for the security  of his workers-labor  accident  and professional  illness-and
has to subscribe to a specific insurance to cover these risks.  The cost ranges
between  1 and 3 percent  of the worker's total  wage.  In addition,  the formal
private  sector  often  provides  medical  coverage  to  its  labor  force,  because
it  is not supplied  by  the Social  Security  scheme.  The cost  of such  private
health  care  schemes  ranges  from 2 to  4 percent  of the total  wage.  Finally,
the compulsory retirement plan provided by the Social Security has led many
fiims to subscribe to additional pension plans for their work force.  In general,
the  cost  of  these  complementary  plans  is  around  12  percent  of  the  wage.
Usually, the costs of health care and retirement plans are shared on an equal
basis by the employer  and the worker.
It should be noted that the  CNSS  does  not  provide  any unemployment
compensation.  As  in most developing  countries,  no  unemployment  benefit
scheme  exists in Morocco.  Replacing the coercive firing regulations  and the
expensive severance  pay upon dismissal by an unemployment  benefit scheme
could be a way to improve the functioning of the urban labor market.
2.3.5  Trade Unions
Morocco has three trade unions with nationwide representations.  They derive
most of their power from their tight relationship with the political parties,  an
heritage  of their intense involvement in the combat  for independence.  Trade
unions are very active and their bargaining power is quite strong in the public
sector  and the private formal  sector.  In particular,  they  play an active role
in enforcing the  collective  conventions  existing  in specific  sectors  (banking,
transport),  as  well as the corpus  of labor rules in the administration and in
public enterprises.  This collective  action creates  a dual situation where  the
workers in any of the unionized  sectors are protected whereas those in other
sectors  are  subject  to  market  forces.  Trade  unions  also  contribute  to the
enforcement  of the  firing and  minimum  wage  regulations,  as  noted  earlier.
In  2001,  trade  unions  were  able  to  negotiate  a  10  percent  increase  in the
minimum wage and a significant  boost in remunerations  in the public sector,
despite low inflation and tight budget constraints.  They have  also for many
years impeded the adoption of a new labor code, due to diverging views with
private employers  on the flexibility  of labor contracts.
152.4  Wage Flexibility
Many of the  institutional  factors  reviewed  earlier  (most  importantly  mini-
mum wage regulation,  firing regulations,  and trade unions with strong  bar-
gaining power)  may hinder  real wage flexibility  in Morocco.  Comprehensive
and  accurate  data  on  the  evolution  of real  wages  across  sectors  and  skill
categories  over time are not available.  Nevertheless,  several  sectoral  surveys
indicate that  real  wages  are somewhat  flexible  in the  urban  labor  market.
For instance,  between  1980  and 1987,  data from the Social Security  (CNSS)
are showing that the real average wage in the private formal sector decreased
by 10 percent.  Using various statistical sources,  Morrisson (1991)  found that
real  wages  in the  industry  and the  public sector  fell substantially  between
1980 and 1986.  Over the 1985-89 period,  due to a rapid growth of temporary
contracts  with low remunerations,  real wages  fell by 2.5  percent  per year in
the manufacturing  sector  and led  to  rapid job creation.  During the  1990s,
real  average wages  increased in the public  and formal  private industrial sec-
tors,  by  around  1.2  percent  and  3.1  percent  a year,  respectively,  driven by
several revisions  in the  minimum  wage  and sweeping  wage  increases  in the
civil  service.
In  Morocco,  nominal  wages  tend  to be partially indexed  to prices.  Ac-
cording  to the econometric  calculations  performed  by  Mouime  (2001),  the
short-term elasticity  of the average  nominal  wage to the consumer  price in-
dex is 0.85 in the formal sector.5 The author also found that in the industrial
sector the wage-productivity  link is explained  by an efficiency  wage relation-
ship.  Although  this  analysis  is  not  differentiated  by levels  of skills  (due to
data limitations),  one would expect  the relationship  to be particularly  rele-
vant  for  skilled  workers,  thus  introducing  a significant  degree  of downward
wage rigidity  for that category of labor in the formal private sector.
The  evidence  presented  here  does  not  imply  that  there  is  no  relative
wage  rigidity  across  skill  categories  and/or  sectors  of  employment.  This
is  important  because  as  discussed  below,  in the  presence  of labor  market
segmentation-an  important  feature  of the Moroccan  urban labor market-
relative  wage  rigidity  across  segments  and  skill categories  may  explain the
persistence of widespread  unemployment.
5The Centre Marocain  de Conjoncture  (2001)  obtains similar results  for  the industrial
sector.
162.5  Domestic  and International Labor Migration
2.5.1  Rural-Urban Migration
Significant  rural-urban  migration  flows heightens  the high pressures  on the
urban labor  market.  Available  estimates  indicate that,  every  year,  around
200.000  migrants  (in  net  terms)  are  entering  urban  areas,  equivalent  to
around  40  percent  of the change  in the  urban  population.  It however  un-
derlies important movements from and to cities,  as well  as international  mi-
grations.  Among other factors,  a low level  of productivity and weak  growth
outcomes  in the agriculture  sector  over  the  last  decade  is  deemed  to  con-
tribute to this dynamics.  Overall,  the rural population is roughly stable  (in
absolute  numbers),  whereas its natural  growth rate around  2.6  percent.  In
fact,  the urban  population,  expanding  at  around  3  percent  a year,  absorbs
most of this expansion.
2.5.2  International Migration
Immigrants from Morocco  represent  an important  share of the foreigners re-
siding in the European  Union.  Due to adverse domestic  economic conditions
and numerous  family  and community  links,  migration  flows  continue to be
important as shown in recent OECD data.  Data are available only for selected
countries and official flows, namely Belgium, France, and Netherlands,  which
are  traditional destinations  for  Moroccan  international  migrants.  Over  the
1990-1999  period,  around 222,000  persons  have migrated to these countries,
equivalent  to around  25,000  on  average  every  year  (see  Figure  4).  Hence,
with  between  6  and  13  percent  of the  change  in the total  domestic  labor
force  (see Figure 5), yearly outflows to the three selected countries somewhat
relieved  pressure on the domestic labor market.  In addition,  the large num-
ber of workers  abroad translates  into  a large  amount  of remittances,  which
represent  a large fraction  of GDP and income  (see Figure 6)  and provide  an
important source  of foreign exchange.
2.6  Constraints and Challenges
The  main  constraints  operating  on the  labor  market  in  Morocco,  and  by
implication the challenges  that policymakers  would have to take up to sub-
stantially lessen unemployment,  can be summarized  as follows.
17*  The population is still growing rapidly. Between  1982 and  1994 (which
corresponds  to the latest  census  available),  the Moroccan  population
grew  by  2,03  percent  on  average  per  year  ; compared  to 2,6  percent
during the  1971-82  period.  This reduction  is  essentially imputable  to
a  decrease  in the  fertility  rate  (3,28  child per  female  in  1994).  Nev-
ertheless,  the population growth rates  remains 40 percent  higher than
the average for middle-income  countries.  Hence, influenced by the joint
effects resulting from the natural  growth rate and the rural  migration
trends,  the urban population expanded  by  27.7 percent  between  1982
and  1994.  In  2001,  56 percent  of the  population  is  estimated  to live
in urban areas.  In fact, the urbanization  of the country  is a long term
tendency contributing  to the labor force  growth.
*  Labor supply is growing at a sustained rate. Within this environment,
and considering the demographic structure of the Moroccan population,
one  of the main  challenge  in the  coming years  will be the absorption
by the urban labor market of a sustained flow of workers.  The pressure
is  more intense  when the situation in the agricultural  sector,  strongly
linked to the  climatic  situation deteriorates:  causing  an  acceleration
in the rural  migrations  pace,  years  of  weak production  are  therefore
associated  with  a significant  growth  in the  urban labor force.  In the
course of the  last  century,  Morocco  has experimented,  on average,  a
year of dryness every three years.  This confirms that, if it was needed,
a sensitive reduction of labor market imbalances  can  only be outlined
on a macroeconomic  perspective  (and also demographic  measures).
*  The potential size of the  labor force  is significant.  Similarly,  women
constitute  a considerable  potential  labor  force.  Indeed,  if for  specific
reasons-education,  social  status,  opportunity  cost  associated  to do-
mestic  activities,  and  so on-their  labor  supply  remains  weak,  their
participation  level should  increase  in the future.  In  addition,  even  in
the hypothesis of a sustained  economic growth,  an improvement  in the
individual  perception  about  the  labor  market  conditions,  could  con-
tribute to amplify the entry, particularly  of women,  into the market.
*  Human capital is weak.  The average  quality,  measured  by educational
attainments,  of the Moroccan active population remains low compared
to similar countries.  The national illiteracy rate stands at 57.7 percent
18(70 percent for women and 44 percent  for men),  whereas in urban areas
48.5 percent  of the population  is illiterate.
As  a  consequence,  in  the future,  the  active  population  will  grow  more
rapidly  than  the  overall  population:  during  the  1996-2010  period,  projec-
tions  are  showing  that  the  population  should  increase  by  1.6  percent  on
average per year,  against a conservative  estimate  of 2.4 percent  for the total
(urban  and rural)  labor  force.  In addition,  during the last decade,  job cre-
ations concerned  essentially temporary occupations  with a low productivity,
and self-employment  activities.  The trends in the urban work force  requires
such a significant  number  of job  creations that,  in the absence  of sustained
growth, the persistence of a substantial rate of urban unemployment  is highly
probable  in the future.
Similarly,  weaknesses  in educational  attainments are worrying,  given the
importance of the educational  level for  growth  (as  in the case  of Southeast
Asian countries).  Recent studies on other countries have also shown this cru-
cial role of human  capital accumulation on growth:  for instance,  an analysis
of the  effects  of various  structural  reform  implemented  in  19  countries  in
the Latin  America  region,  over the  1985-95  period,  reveals the  key  role of
the educational  level  of the  work  force,  which  is one  of the main  determi-
nant  of  productivity.  Therefore,  to boost productivity  and  achieve  higher
growth rates,  educational  level of the Moroccan  work force should be raised
significantly.  Nevertheless,  as  suggested  by a recent  contribution,  the  posi-
tive influence of human capital accumulation  on growth seems to be closely
linked to the  degree  of external  openness  of  a country  ; an  open  economy
stimulate a more efficient  factor  allocation positively  affecting the returns  of
human capital.
A continued effort to improve human capital development  is essential for
trade driven growth.  Indeed, within a context of growing capital mobility and
technology  diffusion, the quality of the human capital stock  is a crucial deter-
minant of comparative  advantage.  It should speed-up  growth throughout  a
rise in productivity,  and allow to attract more foreign direct investment.  This
is  a key  issue  because,  as  a consequence  of the progressive  implementation
by the European  Union  (EU)  of the Uruguay  Round agreement  (it implies
an erosion  of the preferential  access of Moroccan  goods  of the EU market),
national  firms  will  face  increasing  competition  from  low-wage  countries  on
their essential  export markets.  Similarly,  in the perspective of the free trade
zone with the EU (by 2010),  internal competition  will rise.
19In the short term, the structural factors evoked in this section jeopardize
a substantial improvement of the situation.  Indeed,  considering the described
demographic  trends, the rural-urban migration flows,  and the volatile nature
of  growth,  it  is  highly  probable  that  exacerbated  tensions  will  persist  on
the urban labor market.  It is  therefore necessary  to implement  appropriate
policy actions to cope with this situation.
3  A Quantitative Framework
We now  present  a quantitative  framework  to analyze  the  effects  of various
labor  market  reforms  on growth,  employment,  and  wages  in Morocco.  As
noted earlier,  our framework  is based in part on the IMMPA model developed
by Agenor,  Izquierdo,  and Fofack  (2003),  and  Agenor,  Fernandes,  Haddad,
and van der Mensbrugghe  (2003),  suitably modified to reflect the most salient
structural  characteristics  of the  labor  market  in  Morocco.  We  review  the
various building blocks of the model, the structure of which is summarized in
Figure 7.  We consider in turn the production side,  employment,  the demand
side, external trade,  sectoral and aggregate prices, income formation,  and the
public  sector.  Throughout  the  discussion,  we  often use  "generic"  forms to
specify functional relationships;  explicit functional forms,  as well as variable
names and definitions,  are provided in Appendices  A and B.
3.1  Production
We begin with a distinction  on the production side between rural and urban
sectors.  The rural economy is itself divided between  a tradable sector, which
consists  of a homogeneous  good sold abroad  and on domestic  markets,  and
a non-traded  goods sector, which produces  a (composite)  good sold only do-
mestically.  Urban production includes both formal and informal components;
in addition,  the  formal urban  economy  is  separated  between  production  of
private goods  (both traded  and nontraded)  and a public  good.
3.1.1  Rural Production
Land available for each of rural activity is assumed to be in fixed supply and
there is no market to trade property claims on it.  Gross output of non-traded
goods,  XAN,  and exported agricultural goods,  XAT,  are given by the sum of
20value added  (VAN  and  VAT,  respectively)  and intermediate  consumption:
XAN  =  VAN  + XAN  aiAN,  for i = AN, AT, I, P, G  (1)
XAT  =  VAT  + XAT  aiAT,  for i = AN, AT, I, P,  G  (2)
i
where the aij are conventionally-defined  input-output  coefficients  (sales from
sector  i to sector j)  and AN,  AT, I, P, G are used in what follows to refer,
respectively,  to  the  nontraded  agricultural  sector,  the  traded  agricultural
sector,  the informal sector,  the private urban sector,  and the public  sector.
Value  added  in  each  sector  is  assumed  to  be  produced  with  a  Cobb-
Douglas  (CD)  function  of  land,  LAN,  and  a  composite  factor,  defined  as
a  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  function  that  depends  on  the
number  of unskilled  rural  workers  employed  (UAN  in the non-traded-good
sector and  UAT  in the  traded-good  sector)  and  the economy-wide  stock  of
public physical  capital  (KG, which is  defined  below):
VAN  =  CD[LANAN, CES(UAN, KG)],  (3)
VAT  =  CD[LANAT, CES(UAT, KG)].  (4)
For simplicity,  we normalize  the area of land allocated to production  to
unity  in what  follows.  Given the  CD specification,  agricultural  production
exhibits  decreasing returns to scale in the remaining (composite)  input.  The
nontraded agricultural good is exclusively produced for the domestic market,
XAN  =  DAN,  (5)
whereas  production  of the  rural  traded good  is  allocated  to both  domestic
consumption  and exports  (see below).
3.1.2  Urban Informal Production
Gross  production  in the  urban  informal  sector,  XI,  is given  as  the sum of
value added,  VI,  and intermediate  consumption:
XI=VI+XIEaui,  for i = AN, AT, I, P, G  (6)
21Value  added  is  given  as  a function  of the  number  of unskilled  workers
employed  in the informal  economy,  U,, with decreasing  returns to scale:
VI  = axiU>X',  axI > 0,  0 < oxI < 1.  (7)
FRom  (7),  the demand for  labor in the informal sector can be derived  as
U  =  3xI(Vi/wi),  (8)
where  w,  is the product  wage  given  by w,  = W 1/PVI, with  PVI  denoting
the price of value added in the informal sector  (defined below).
3.1.3  Production of public  goods  and services
Gross  production  of public  goods  and services  (or  public  good,  for short),
XG, is given by the sum of value added,  VG,  and intermediate consumption:
XG = VG +XGZaiG,  for i = AN, AT, I, P, G  (9)
i
Value  added  in the  public  sector  is  measured  by the  government  wage
bill:
VG = (WUGUG +  WSGSG)/PVG.  (10)
Employment levels of both categories of workers are treated as exogenous.
3.1.4  Urban Formal Private Production
Private  formal  production  uses  as inputs  both  skilled  and unskilled  labor,
as well as physical  capital.  Skilled labor and private physical  capital have  a
higher degree of complementarity  (lower degree of substitution) than physical
zapital and unskilled workers.  In order to account  explicitly  for these differ-
-nces  in the degree of substitutability among inputs, we adopt a nested CES
production  structure.  Specifically  gross  production  of the  private  formal-
arban  sector, Xp,  is taken to be given  by the sum of value  added,  Vp,  and
intermediate consumption:
Xp = Vp  + Xp  aip,  for i = AN, AT, I,P,G  (11)
22where
VP  = CES{CES[CES(Sp, Kp), Up], (UU +  S)dcop  (12)
where dcop > 0. At the lowest  level of equation  (12),  skilled  labor,  Sp, and
private  capital,  Kp,  are  combined  to form  the composite  input  T2,  with  a
low elasticity  of substitution  between  them.  At the  second level,  this com-
posite input is used together with unskilled labor, Up,  to form the composite
input  T1. The elasticity  of substitution  between  T2  and  unskilled  workers,
Up,  is  higher  than between  Sp  and  Kp.  The final  layer  combines  T1 and
Kcl(Uu +  S),  the ratio  of the stock  of government  capital to the total size
of the labor force in the urban sector,  as production inputs.  When dcop = 0,
there  are no congestion  effects.  By contrast, When  dcop  > 0, the larger the
urban  population  is,  the more  congested  public capital  is,  and the  lower  is
its contribution  to private urban production.
Private firms in the urban formal sector allocate their output to exports,
Ep, or the domestic market,  Dp, according to a production  possibility fron-
tier,  defined by a constant  elasticity of transformation  (CET) function:
Xp = CET(Ep, Dp).  (13)
As  shown  later,  the ratio Ep/Dp depends  on the relative  prices  of ex-
ported and domestic  goods.
3.2  Wages,  Employment,  Migration and Skills  Acqui-
sition
Unskilled  workers in the economy may be employed either in the rural econ-
omy,  UR,  or in the urban economy,  uu,  whereas skilled workers  are employed
only  in  the urban  economy.  We  also  assume  that  skilled  workers  are  not
employed  in the informal  economy  either-perhaps  as  a result  of signaling
considerations,  as discussed later.
3.2.1  Rural Wages,  Employment,  and Internal Migration
The demand for  labor in the export sector consistent  with profit  maximiza-
d tion,  UAT,  is given by
rrd  Tr+1  1XA  1  PXAT d  1  VAT1XAT  1  -
7 XAT  /XAT  l+PXAT  WA
UAT  =  (VAT'  WAT  ce  PXAT  )  where  WAT  - PVA'
(14)
23where WA  denotes the nominal wage in the agricultural sector and PVAT  the
net output price in the traded  agricultural  sector  (both determined  below).
Equation  (14)  indicates that labor demand in the rural export sector is pos-
itively related to the level of net  output,  VAT,  and negatively  related to the
effective product  wage in that sector,  WAT.
The demand for labor  in the nontraded  agricultural sector is given  by an
equation similar to  (14):
d  1XAN  - ?XAN 
3XAN  \ 
1+PXAN  WA
UAN  =  (VAN  WAN  a,XAN  where  WAN  =  PVAN'
(15)
with again WAN  denoting the product wage  in that sector.
Nominal wages in agriculture,  WA,  adjust to clear the labor market.  With
UR representing  labor supply in agriculture, the equilibrium condition is thus
given by
UR = UAN(VAN,  PVA)+UT(VAT  ).  (16)
The size  of the labor  force  in the rural sector,  UR,  is  predetermined  at
any  given point in time.  Over time,  UR  grows  at the exogenous  population
growth rate, 9R, net of worker  migration to urban areas,  MIG:
UR =  UR,-1(  +  9R) - MIG.  (17)
Following Harris and Todaro (1970),  the incentives to migrate are taken to
depend negatively on the ratio of the average  expected  consumption wage in
rural areas to that prevailing in urban areas.  Unskilled  workers in the urban
economy  may  be  employed  either  in the  formal  sector,  in which  case  they
are paid a minimum wage,  WM,  or they can enter the informal economy and
receive the market-determined  wage in that sector,  WI.  When rural workers
make the decision to migrate to urban areas,  they are uncertain as to which
type of job they will be able to get, and therefore weigh wages in each sector
by  the probability  of finding  a job  in that  sector.  These probabilities  are
approximated  by prevailing  employment  ratios.  Finally,  potential migrants
also consider what their expected  purchasing  power in rural and urban areas
will be, depending on whether they stay in the rural sector and consume the
"typical"  basket  of goods  of rural households,  or  migrate  and  consume  the
"typical"  urban basket  of goods.
24The expected,  unskilled urban real wage,  Ewu, is thus a weighted average
of the minimum wage in the formal sector and the going wage in the informal
sector, deflated  by an urban consumption  price index, PuU  (defined below):
Ewu = OuWM,-1  +  (1 - OU)I-  (18)
PUU,-I 
where  Ou  is the probability  of finding a job in the urban  formal sector,
measured by the proportion of unskilled workers in the private formal sector,
relative  to the total  number  of unskilled  urban workers  looking for  a job in
the  urban  formal sector  (net  of government  employment),  in the previous
period:
- Up,_1  (19)
A similar reasoning  is used to calculate  the expected  rural consumption
real wage,  EWA.  Here the employment probability is equal to unity, because




where PR is the composite,  rural consumption  price index  (defined below).
The migration function can therefore be specified as
[1  EWA  UR,-2  (20)
where 0 < Am  < 1 measures  the speed of adjustment  and aM  > 0 measures
the elasticity  of migration flows with respect  to expected  wages.  This speci-
fication  assumes that  costs associated with migration or other frictions  may
delay the migration process,  introducing persistence  in migration flows.
3.2.2  Urban Unskilled  Wages,  Employment,  and Unemployment
The public  sector  employs  an exogenous  number  of unskilled  workers,  UG,
at the nominal  wage  rate WUG,  whereas  the demand  for unskilled  labor  by
the formal private sector is determined  by firms'  profit maximization  subject
to the given minimum  wage,  WM.  Both wages  are partially  indexed to the
overall consumer  price index, PLEV:
WUG  =  WUG  . PLEVindUG,  WM  =  WM  . PLEVindM,  (21)
25where  WM  and  WUG  measure  real  wages  in constant terms,  and 0 < induG,
indM  <  1.  In the simulation  exercises  reported later,  we  actually  assume
that both wages  are fully indexed  (indUG = indM = 1).
Labor demand by the formal private sector  is determined  by firms'  profit
maximization.  We  assume  also  that  firms  pay  a  payroll  tax,  at  the rate
0  < ptaxu  <  1 for  unskilled  workers,  that is  proportional  to the wage  bill,
WMUP.  Unskilled  labor demand by the private sector  is thus given by
Ud  (  1,  flxp 1 axPl  Wm.
((1  + ptazu)wMax'  where  M  )  PT  (22)
In order to avoid corner solutions,  we assume that the wage rate paid to
unskilled labor in the formal urban sector  is systematically  greater than the
real  wage  rate paid in the  informal  sector.  Consequently,  unskilled  urban
workers  will first seek employment  in the private formal  sector.  The actual
level of employment  in that sector  is  determined  according to equation  (22).
We also  assume that,  as  a result  of relocation  and congestion  costs,  mo-
bility of the unskilled labor force between the formal and the informal sectors
is  imperfect.  Migration  flows  are determined  by expected  income  opportu-
nities,  along the lines of Harris and Todaro  (1970).6  Specifically,  the supply
of unskilled  workers  in the  formal  sector  (including  public  sector  workers),
UF, is assumed to change  gradually over time  as a function  of the expected
wage  differential  across  sectors,  measured  in real  terms.  Wage  and employ-
ment prospects are formed on the basis of prevailing  conditions  in the labor
market.  Because  there is no job turnover  in the  public sector, the  expected
nominal wage in the formal economy is equal to the minimum wage weighted
by the probability of being hired in the Private sector.  Assuming that hiring
in that sector is random,  this probability  can be approximated  by the ratio
of currently  employed  workers to those seeking employment  at the previous
period,  U_I/(U_1 - UG,- 1 ).  The expected  nominal  wage  in the informal
economy,  WI,  is  simply  the  going  wage,  because  there  are  no  barriers  to
entry in  that sector.  Assuming  a  one-period  lag,  changes  in the supply  of
unskilled  workers  in the formal  sector  (measured  in proportion  of the total
6Note  that  in the present  setup the Harris-  Todaro  framework  is used  to explain mi-
gration  flows  between  the  (urban)  informal  sector  and the  (urban)  formal  sector,  rather
than migration between  the rural and the urban sectors.
26urban unskilled  labor force) thus evolves over time  according to
_  ~~~~Upd  _ 1 WM,_  (- 3 F  lj
U  =  F [aF  In (us  - UG,-1 WI _  UU2  (23)
where  OF  >  0 denotes  the  speed  of  adjustment.7 The  rate  of  unskilled
unemployment  in the formal sector,  UNEMPU, is thus given by
UNEMPU = 1-  (UG + UP)  (24)
The supply of labor in the informal economy,  U7, is obtained by subtract-
ing from the urban unskilled  labor force,  Uu, the quantity  Up +  UG:
U, = UU-UF  (25)
The  informal  labor  market  clears  continuously,  so that  Uj  =  Ul.  FRom
equations (8)  and  (25),  the equilibrium nominal wage  is thus given by
WI = 3XI( PVI  )  (26)
The urban unskilled labor supply,  Uu, grows as a result of "natural" urban
population growth and migration of unskilled  labor from the rural economy,
as discussed  earlier.  Moreover,  some urban  unskilled  workers,  SKL, do  ac-
quire skills and leave the unskilled labor force to increase the supply of skilled
labor in the economy.  We make  the additional  assumption  that individuals
are  born unskilled,  and therefore  natural urban population  growth  (not re-
sulting from migration or  skills acquisition factors)  is represented  by urban
unskilled  population  growth  only,  at the  exogenous  rate 9u.  Finally,  there
are  international  migrations,  the flow  of which  is measured  by IMIG (see
below).  Thus, the size of the urban unskilled labor supply  evolves according
to
Uu  Uu,_1(1 + gu) + MIG - SKL - IMIG.  (27)
7As noted  by Agenor  (1999),  the absence of on-the-job  search  in the informal  sector in
the present setup can be justified  in a variety of ways.  An important consideration  is the
existence of informational  inefficiencies,  which may result from the absence  of institutions
capable  of processing  and providing  in  a timely  manner relevant  information  on job  op-
portunities  to potential  applicants.  As  a result,  search  activities  for  unskilled workers  in
the formal sector may  require, literally speaking,  waiting  for job offers  at factory gates.
273.2.3  Urban Skilled  Wages,  Employment  and Unemployment
As noted earlier, the employment  levels of both skilled and unskilled  workers
in  the public  (urban)  sector  are  taken  as  exogenous.  The  nominal  wage
that skilled workers earn,  WsG, is indexed on the relevant  consumption price
index:
WSG  = WSGpids,  (28)
where WSG  is an exogenous  real wage level,  and 0 < indsG < 1.8
Private  urban  firms  pay  a  payroll  tax  on for  skilled  labor,  at  the rate
O < ptaxs < 1, which is proportional to the wage bill, WsSp.  FRom  (12), the
demand for skilled labor is given  by
Sdp  ~~1  f
3 XP2  ~  XP2Ws
=T2K-S (hereaws)ws  ) (1 +ptaxs)ws  PxpP2  ,  s  PT 2 (29)
The nominal wage for skilled labor in the private sector, Ws, is determined
on the basis of a "monopoly union"  approach,  as follows.9 Let w'  denote the
consumption real  wage, that is,  the nominal wage earned by skilled workers
deflated  by the cost-of-living index that these workers face  in the urban sec-
tor, PUS. w'  is assumed set by a centralized labor union whose objective is to
maximize  a utility function that depends on deviations  of both employment
and the consumption wage from their target levels, subject to the firm's labor
demand schedule.  Specifically,  the union's utility function is given by
U = (w,  - wT)v(Spd  _ SP)I  v,  0 < v < 1,  (30)
where Sp  is  given by equation  (29).  The quantities  wcT  and  S3T  measure the
union's  wage  and employment  targets,  respectively,  and  are both assumed
predetermined  with respect  to  w'.  The  parameter  v  reflects  the  relative
8To avoid  a corner solution in which no worker  would want to seek employment  in the
public sector, we assume that working for the government provides  a nonpecuniary benefit
(perhaps  in terms  of higher job  security or  reduced  volatility of future  earnings)  that  is
sufficiently large to  ensure that the  differential  between  WSG  and  Ws  is not  "excessive"
(in the sense  that SG  remains positive  at all times).
9See  Agenor (2003)  for a more detailed discussion.  Alternatively,  one could  assume that
firms and  the union  bargain over  wages,  with firms  determining  employment.  As  shown
formally,  by Creedy and  McDonald  (1991),  from the point of view of wage determination
this approach  would  not  lead  to  a' specification  that  differs  much  from  the  one  derived
below.
28importance  that the union  attaches  to wage  deviations,  as opposed  to em-
ployment  deviations.
Substituting the labor  demand  curve  (29)  in the utility  function  above,
the union's problem is thus
max(w-w5Dv {2S(  PT2  OXP2 )O'XP2  _  ST}1- max(wc  - wT ~T 2KS(  P 2 fx
(v5  PUS(1 + ptaX5)W5  0gXP2
The first-order  condition is given by
IJ {  _}  - (1  - v)  {  O'  _  }  L1XP2( S)  =0,
or equivalently,  normalizing  the target  level of employment  SpT  to zero:
VSdp  (1-V)cOXp2Sp  d
L'  5-  WT  wc
This expression can be solved for the optimal wage:
CT wc =  Ws
S  1-M/(  1-V)uXP 2 '
where we assume that 1 -V/(1-  V)xP2  >  0.
The union's target wage,  w5T, is assumed to be related positively to skilled
wages  in the public  sector  (measured  in terms of the relevant  price  index),
WSG,  and negatively to the skilled  unemployment  rate,  UNEMPS, and the
firing cost per skilled worker, fs.  Wage-setting in the public sector is assumed
to  play a signaling  role  to wage  setters  in the  rest  of the  economy.  When
unemployment  is high,  the probability  of finding a job  (at any given  wage)
is low.  Consequently,  the higher the unemployment  rate, the  greater the in-
centive for the union to moderate its wage demands  and boost employment.
Firing costs do prevent  excessive job losses in bad times (thereby preventing
the loss of firm-specific human capital if downturns  are temporary)  but they
also discourage  new hires-for  instance because  if workers  prove to be inad-
equate  matches  with their job requirements,  reversing mismatches  is  costly.
The union internalizes the disincentive effect of severance  payments on labor
demand.  As  a result, the higher the firing cost,  the greater the incentive  for
29the union to reduce its wage  demands,  in order to  encourage  firms  to hire.
The above expression  can thus be rewritten  as
Ws = PusUNEMP  3(fs/Pus))2w(
1-v/(l-V)oxP2
where UNEMPS is defined  below.  This equation implies, in particular, that
a  higher  level  of  unemployment  lowers  the  level  of  wages,  as  implied  by
various types of efficiency-wage  models.
Given that firms set nominal wages and are on their labor demand curve,
open skilled unemployment  may emerge.  The rate of skilled unemployment,
UNEMPs, is  given  by  the ratio  of skilled  workers  who  are  not  employed
either by the private or the public sector,  divided by the total population  of
skilled workers: c_  _  cSd
UNEMPs=  S  P.  (32)
We assume that skilled workers who are unable to find a job in the formal
economy opt to remain  open  unemployed,  instead  of entering  the  informal
economy  (in contrast  to unskilled workers),  perhaps  because  of adverse  sig-
naling effects.
The evolution  of  the  skilled  labor  force  depends  on  the rate  at  which
unskilled workers  acquire skills:
S  = (1 - 6s)S-1 + SKL_1,  (33)
where  0  < Es < 1 is the rate of "depreciation"  or  "de-skilling"  of the skilled
labor  force.
3.2.4  Skills  Acquisition
The acquisition  of skills  by unskilled workers  is  assumed to depend  on three
factors:  a) relative expected consumption wages of skilled to unskilled urban
workers  (as  a proxy for the future stream of earnings  associated with higher
levels  of education);  and  b) the government  stock of education  capital,  KE,
which  limits the ability to invest in skills.
Consider  first  the  effect  of wages.  In  case  they  acquire  skills,  current
unskilled workers  expect to earn wage Ws if they are employed (with proba-
bility OS)  and nothing if they are unemployed.  The purchasing  power of this
30wage is obtained  by deflating it by a skilled consumption price index, Pus,-
(defined below):
Ews = 0s WS,-1
'~  Pus,-,1
where Os  is approximated  by the initial ratio of the number of skilled workers
employed  in the private  sector,  over the total number of skilled workers that
are not  employed in the public sector:
Os  =  - SG,1  (34)
S-1-  SG,-l1
If they remain unskilled,  workers expect to get the average unskilled wage,
which is a weighted average of the minimum wage WM  and the informal wage
rate.  Assuming,  again,  that  there  is no job turnover  in the public sector,
the  average  expected  real wage  is  given by  (18),  which  is repeated  here  for
convenience:
Ewu  - OUWM,-1  +  (1 - OU)W 1 ,- 1
PUU,-1
with Ou  as defined  above.
Given these effects,  the flow increase  in the supply of skilled  labor can be
written as:
SKL = AS  [e  (Ews)  (KE,-1)UE]  +  (1 -As)SKL1,
where  0 < As < 1, and  r,,  is  a shift parameter.10
3.2.5  International Labor Migration
As  noted  earlier,  international  migrations  are  an  important  feature  of the
labor  market  in  Morocco.  We  assume  here  that  migration  involves  only
unskilled  workers,  and  that  potential  migrants  are  in the  urban  sector  (as
captured  in  (27)).  Moreover,  international  migration  flows  are taken to be
determined  by two factors:  the prevailing unskilled unemployment rate in the
formal  urban sector,  and  the expected  urban real  wage  for  unskilled  labor,
1 0Note that  we abstract  from  the cost of acquiring skills  (as measured  by the  number
of years of schooling  multiplied  by the  average  cost of education per  year),  which should
also affect the propensity  to invest in skills  acquisition.
31Ewu, given by  (18),  relative to the expected foreign wage measured in terms
of the domestic urban price  index, EWF, defined  as
EWF  =ER  * WF,- 1
PUU,-i
with  WF  denoting the foreign  wage measured in foreign-currency  terms, as-
sumed exogenous.  Adopting  a specification  similar  to  (20),  the  migration
function is specified  as
[  (EWF)]  IMIG = Uu,lAim  1 amIM  n K  )+  (I  Xim,)~  U_1 1MIG-1,
where  0  <  Aim  <  1 measures  the  speed  of  adjustment,  and  uCM  > 0 the
partial  elasticity  of migration  flows with respect  to expected  wages.  Again,
costs  associated  with  migration  (such  as  relocation  costs)  are  assumed  to
introduce some degree of persistence (see Lopez and Schiff (1998) for a further
discussion).  As  discussed  below,  remittances  associated  with international
migration flows of unskilled labor are assumed to benefit unskilled households
in the urban formal  and informal sectors.
3.3  Supply and Demand
Both the informal  and  public  sector goods  are  nontraded.  Total supply in
each sector is thus equal to gross production,  that is
Q'  = XI,  QG = XG  (37)
Similarly, there are no imports of tradable agricultural goods,  and part of
it is exported.  Total supply is thus equal to gross production  minus exports,
EAT:
QAT  =  XAT  - EAT  (38)
Agricultural nontraded and private formal urban goods, by contrast,  com-
pete with imported goods.  The supply of the composite good for each of these
sectors consists of a CES combination of imports and domestically produced
goods:
QAN  =  CES(MAN, DAN),  (39)
Q=  CES(MP, Dp),  (40)
32where  DAN = XAN,  as noted earlier
Aggregate  demand  for each of these sectors  consists  of intermediate  and
final  consumption,  government  spending,  and investment  demand.  For the
trade and nontraded  agricultural sectors, aggregate  demand (QdN and Q  T)
consists of demand for final consumption by the private sector  (CAN and C,)
and the government  (GAN  and GAT)  and intermediate consumption (INTAN
and INTAT):
QAN  =  CAN  +  GAN +  INTAN,  (41)
QAT  =  CAT  + GAT  +  INTAT,  (42)
For  the informal  sector,  aggregate  demand  (Qd)  consists  of demand  for
intermediate  and final consumption  only:
I = Cl + INT,,  (43)
Aggregate  demand for the public good  and the private  formal good,  Qd
and Qdp, consists of demand for intermediate and final consumption by house-
holds and the government, and investment demand, ZpG and ZpP by the formal
private sector (as defined below), and ZG by the government  (which requires
only private urban goods):
QG  = CG + GG +  ZPG + INTG,  (44)
Qdp=Cp+ Gp  + (Zpp + ZG)+INTp.  (45)
In the above  expressions,  INT;  is defined  as total demand  (by  all  pro-
ductions sectors)  for intermediate  consumption of good j:
INT, =  E  ajiX 1 for j  = AN, AT, I, P, G.  (46)
i
Government  expenditure on good j,  Gj, is expressed  in real terms as:
Gj =  gg NG  Q  for j = AN, AT, G,  P,  (47)
where NG  represents  total government  current  expenditure  on  goods  and
services  (which is fixed in nominal terms),  PQh is the market  price of goods
33purchased  by the government,  and E  ggj = 1. Note that the government  is
assumed not to spend on informal sector  goods.
Final  consumption  for  each  production  sector  i,  Ci,  is  the  summation
across all categories of households of nominal consumption of good i, deflated
by the demand  price of good i:
C, = E  Cih =E  Xih +  Eh  Ccih(CONh - Ei  PQiXih)  (48)
h  h  PQi
where  Cih is  consumption  of good  i by  household  h,  Xih  is the  subsistence
(or autonomous)  level of consumption of good i by household h, CONh total
nominal  consumption  expenditure  by household  h,  and PQi the composite
sales price of good i (defined below).  Equations  (??)  are based on the linear
expenditure  system.  Coefficients  CC 1h  indicate  how total nominal  consump-
tion expenditure  by  household  h,  CONh,  is  allocated  to each type of good
and satisfy the restrictions:
O  <  CCih <  1,  Vi, h,  ECCih=1
Finally,  total private  investment  by private  urban firms,  Zp,  consists  of
purchases  of both  public and  urban formal  private goods  and services  (ZpG
and ZPP, respectively):
zip = zzi PK  ZP,where zzG + zzp=1.
PQi 
Coefficients  zzi  measure  the  allocation  of  total  investment  demand  to
public and urban private  goods.
3.4  External  Erade
Exports of the tradable agricultural good are determined  as a residual,  once
domestic demand  is satisfied.  From  (38)  and  (42),  and setting QAT  =  QdAT,
exports  are thus  determined  by
EAT =  XAT  - (CAT + GAT  + INTAT).  (49)
As indicated  earlier,  firms in the private formal sector allocate their out-
put to exports or the domestic market according to the production possibility
34frontier  (PPF) specified  in equation  (13).  Efficiency conditions  yield:
Ep=D(D  PEp  1-  3TP)  (50)
where  PEp is  the  price  of  exports  and  PDp the  price  of  domestic  sales
(determined  below).
We assume that imports compete with domestic goods in the agricultural
nontraded  sector  as  well  as  in  the  private  formal  sector.  Making  use  of
Armington  functions  for the demand  for  imported  vs.  domestic  goods  and
relative prices, import demand for both sectors  (MA and MP) can be written
as:
MAN  DAN  ( PD  1QA  )  (51)
Mp= Dp (PDP  1 /  )  QP  (52)
These  equations  show  that  the  ratio  of  imports  to  both  categories  of
domestic goods depends on the relative prices of these goods and the elasticity
of substitution,  YQA  and oqp, between these goods.
3.5  Prices
The net or value added  price of output  is given by the gross price, PXi, net
of indirect taxes, less the cost of intermediate inputs (purchased at composite
prices):
PVi =Vi- lPXi(l  - indtaxi) - EajiPQj  }Xi,  i,j=AN,AT,I,P,G,
(53)
where  indtaxi is  the rate  of  indirect  taxation  of output  in  sector  i  (with
indtax, = 0 because there is no indirect taxation of informal sector output).
The world  prices  of imported  and exported  goods  are  taken to  be  ex-
ogenously  given.  The  domestic  currency  price  of these  goods  is  obtained
by adjusting  the  world  price by the exchange  rate,  with  import prices  also
adjusted by the tariff rate, tm:
PEi = wpe2ER,  for i = AT, P,  (54)
35PMi =  wpmi(1 + tmi)ER,  for i =  AN, P.  (55)
Because the transformation  function between exports and domestic sales
of the  urban  private  good  is  linear  homogeneous,  the  sales  price,  PXp,  is
derived  from the expenditure  identity:
PXPXP = PDPDP  + PEPEP,
that is,
PX-  PDPDP  + PEPEP  (56)
XP
with PDP determined  from  the equality  between the  supply  of composite
goods  (40)  and the demand for  these goods (45).
For the informal  and public sectors  (both of which do not export and do
not compete with imports),  the sales price is  equal to the domestic  market
price.  In the  agricultural  sector,  the  sales price  of the  traded  agricultural
good,  PXAT,  is simply  the domestic-currency  price of agricultural  exports,
'PEAT, whereas  the sales  price of the  non-traded  good,  PXAN,  is  equal  to
the domestic  price of agricultural  goods,  PDAN.
For the nontraded  agricultural  sector  and private urban  production,  the
substitution  function  between  imports  and  domestic  goods  is  also  linearly
homogeneous,  and the  (composite)  market  price  is  determined  accordingly
by the expenditure  identity:
PQ,Qd = PDiDi  + PMiMi, for  i =  AN, P,
that is
PQi = PDDQi  Q4  for i = AN, P,  (57)
with QAN  =QAN
For those sectors that do not compete with imports  (informal and public
goods), the domestic price,  PDi, is simply equal to the  market price,  PXi:
PDi = PXi, for i = I,  G.  (58)
The nested CES production function of private formal urban goods is also
linearly homogeneous;  prices of the composite inputs are therefore derived in
similar  fashion:
T1PT 1 = T2PT2 +  (1 + ptaxu)WmUP.  (59)
36T2PT2 = PROFP  + (1 + ptaxs)WsSp,  (60)
where  PROFP  is  profits  by private  sector  firms  in the  urban formal  sector
(defined below).
The price of (private)  capital  is constructed  by using the investment  ex-
penditure  identity  for  private  firms,  which  involves  those  goods  for  which
there is investment demand,  namely, the public good and private-formal  ur-
ban good  (see equations  (44)  and  (45)):
PK = PQGZP + PQPZP  (61)
ZP
In solving the model,  we use equations  (37)  to determine the equilibrium
quantities  Q,  and QG, that is,  equations  (6)  and  (9),  respectively.  We  use
the demand equations  (43)  and  (44)  to solve residually for Cl and  CG, that
is:
X,-INT, = C,,  (62)
XG-GG-ZG-INTG = CG.  (63)
Equation  (48)  for i = I, G, is then solved  for PQI = PX1 and PQg  =
PXG, respectively.  Define  discretionary  consumption  expenditure  of house-
hold h, CONDh, as
CONDh = CONh - PQiXih,  (64)
and define the share of autonomous  consumption of good i in total consump-
tion of good i,  acj, as
aci =  P  C  =  C  (65) a1 PQic.  C,
Then,  from (48),  we have
PXi =(1-ac)l.  {hCChCONDh}  i =I,  G.  (66)
The consumption  price index for the rural sector  is given by
PR  =  ZwriPQi,
37whereas the consumption price indexes  for urban unskilled and skilled work-
ers are given by
Puu =  wu1ipQi,  Pus = ZwsiPQi,  (67)
i  i
where the wri, wui  and wsi are relative weights that are such that
Z  wri =  Ewui = Ewsi=1.
i  i  i
3.6  Profits and Income
Firms'  profits  are defined  as revenue minus total labor costs.  In the case of
agricultural traded and nontraded sector  firms,  profits are given by
PROF, = PVIV  - WAUI,  for i = AT, AN,  (68)
whereas in the case of the urban informal sector firms,  we have
PROF, = PV,V, - W,U,.  (69)
Profits  of  private-urban  sector  firms  account  for  salaries  paid  to  both
categories  of workers:
PROFp = PVpVp-(1  ptaxu)UpWM-(1 + ptaxs)SpWs-FC,  (70)
where total firing costs are given by
FC = fu max(O, Up,-  - Up) + fs max(0, Sp,-,  - SP),  (71)
with fs, fu  denoting  the fixed  firing cost  per worker  (skilled  and unskilled,
respectively).
Firms'  income is equal to profits minus corporate taxes and interest pay-
ments on foreign loans.  Assuming that only firms in the formal urban econ-
omy accumulate  capital and pay income  taxes yields:
YFi = PROFi, for  i = AN, AT, I,  (72)
YFp = (1 - inctaxF)PROFp  - IF  ER  FLp,- 1 ,  (73)
38where inctazF is the corporate income tax rate, IF  is the foreign interest rate
(taken to be exogenous),  and FLP is the level of foreign borrowing by private-
urban  firms.  The path of FLP is  set exogenously,  to account implicitly  for
ceilings that domestic firms may face in their access to foreign  markets.
Household  income  is  based on  the return to  labor  (salaries),  distributed
profits,  and transfers.  Households  are defined according  to both labor  cate-
gories  and their sector of location.
*  There  are two  types  of rural  households,one  comprising  workers  em-
ployed  in the  traded sector,  and  the other  workers  in the non-traded
sector.
*  In the urban sector there are two types  of unskilled  households,  those
working in the informal sector and those employed in the formal sector.
*  The fifth type of household  consists  of skilled workers  employed  in the
formal urban economy  (in both the private  and public sectors).
*  There are capitalist-rentier  households whose income comes from firms'
earnings in the formal private sector, the agricultural traded sector and
commercial  banks.
We  further  assume that households  in both the non-traded  agricultural
sector  and in the informal  urban economy  own  the firms in which they are
employed-an  assumption that captures  the fact that firms in these sectors
tend indeed to be small,  family-owned  enterprises.
Income  of the agricultural  nontraded household  is given by
YHAN  = YFAN  +  WAUAN  +  YANTRH,  (74)
where O < YAN  < 1 is the portion of total government  transfers  (TRH) that
the group  receives,  WAUAN  denote wage earnings,  and YFAN  firms'  income
in these sectors.
Income of the urban informal household is given by
YHI = YF1 +  WIUV  + 7 1TRH + TIER  REMIT,  (75)
where  0 <  y1 <  1, W1 U1 ,  and  YFI  have the same interpretation  as  above.
REMIT measures the foreign-currency  value of the flow of remittances from
39(unskilled)  workers  employed  abroad,  and 0 < r1 < 1 the fraction  of these
remittances  that are  allocated to households  in the informal  economy.
Income  of  the  agricultural  traded  sector  household,  as  well  as  that  of
the  urban  formal  skilled  household,  depends  on  government  transfers  and
salaries,  and  possibly  redundancy  payments.  Firms  provide  no  source  of
income,  because these groups do not own the production  units in which they
are employed:
YHAT  =  WAUAT  +  YATTRH,  (76)
YHS  = (WSSP + WSGSG)  + fs max(0, SP,-1 - SP) + 'ySTRH,  (77)
where  0 <  YAT,YS  < 1*
Similarly,  in the absence  of any  income  from. firms,  income  of the urban
formal unskilled  household  depends  on govermnent  transfers,  salaries  (from
both private  and the public sectors),  remittances  from abroad,  and possibly
redundancy  payments:
YHUF  =  'YUFTRH  + WMUP + WUGUG +  fu max(0, Up,1 - Up) (78)
+(1- r)ER- REMIT,
where 0 <  YUF  < 1. As noted earlier, foreign remittances are allocated either
to informal sector  households  or unskilled urban households.
Firms'  income  in the traded  agricultural  and private  urban  sectors  goes
to the capitalist-rentier  household.  Because there is no capital  accumulation
in the traded  agricultural  sector to be financed,  the entire  amount  of firms'
profits  from that  sector  are  transferred  to the  capitalist-rentier  household.
By contrast,  firms in the private urban sector retain a portion of their after-
tax earnings,  0 < re <  1,  for investment financing purposes  and transfer the
remainder  to the capitalist-rentier  household,  whose income  is thus:
YHKAP  =  YFAT +  (1 - re)YFp +  hKApTRH,  (79)
where  0  < YKAP  < 1-
3.7  Consumption,  Savings,  and Investment
Each category of household  h saves a constant fraction,  0  < savrateh < 1, of
its disposable  income:
SAVh  =  savrateh(l - inctaXh)YHh,  (80)
40where 0  < inctaXh  < 1 is the income tax rate applicable to household h.
The  portion of disposable  income  that is  not saved  is  allocated  to  con-
sumption:
CONh =  (1  - inctaXh)YHh - SAVh.
The  accumulation  of capital  over  time  depends  on the  flow  level  of in-
vestment,  Zp, and the depreciation  rate of capital from the previous  period,
6p  ll
Kp = Kp_,(l - 6p) +  Zp,- 1 ,  (81)
where  0 < 
6p  < 1 is a constant depreciation  rate.
The aggregate identity between savings and investment implies that total
investment,  given  by  PK* Zp +  PQpZG, must  be equal  to total  savings,
equal to firms'  after-tax retained  earnings, total after-tax household savings,
government  savings,  and foreign borrowing by firms and the government:
PK. Zp + PQPZG = re*  YFp  + E  SAVh  - CDEF  + ER(AFLp + AFLG),
h
(82)
where  FLE  is foreign  borrowing  by the government  (assumed  exogenous  in
foreign-currency terms) and CDEF  the current public budget deficit (defined
below).  In the simulations  reported  below, this equation  is solved residually
for the level  of private  investment,  Z.  Thus,  the model  is  "savings driven"
(corresponding  to the  "classical"  closure rule discussed  by Dewatripont  and
Michel  (1987))  a reasonable  assumption  in our view for Morocco,  in light of
the behavior of net saving during the second part of the 1990s.  Indeed, during
the period 1996-99,  net government dissaving was accompanied  by an increase
in net private saving, which may have resulted from private investment  being
lower  than otherwise.  In addition,  as noted  by Schmidt-Hebbel  and  Muller
(1992) in their review of the behavior of private investment during the period
1970-88,  public sector deficits had a stroing negative impact on private capital
formation in Morocco.  Of course,  alternative  closure rules are possible.  For
instance,  with  private investment treated  as exogenous,  equation  (82)  could
be  solved  for  the  savings  rate of  capitalists-rentiers,  as  in Agenor  (2003).
This closure rule would make the model  "investment  driven."
"Capital  gains or losses  associated with  changes  in the price of capital are  assumed  to
affect  changes over time  of firms'  net worth (given  by PK  K - ER- FLp), without  any
direct feedback on the economy.
413.8  Government
Government  expenditures  consist  of government  consumption,  which  only
has demand-side effects,  and public investment,  which has both demand-  and
supply-side  effects.  Public  investment  consists  of investment  in infrastruc-
ture,  education,  and  health."2 We  define  investment  in  infrastructure  as
the expenditure  affecting the  accumulation  of public infrastructure  capital,
which includes  public  assets such  as  roads,  power plants  and railroads.  In-
vestment  in education  affects  the stock  of public education  capital,  which
consists  of assets  such as school  buildings and other infrastructure  affecting
skills acquisition, but does not represent human capital.  In a similar fashion,
investment in health adds to the stock of public assets such as hospitals and
other government  infrastructure  affecting  health.
Rom  (10),  PVGVG - (WUGUG  +  WSGSG) =0,  that  is,  all value  added
in the production  of public goods is distributed  as wages.  Thus, the current
fiscal deficit,  -CDEF, is  defined  as
-CDEF = TXREV  - TRH - NG - IFGER  FLG, 1 ,  (83)
where TXREV  denotes total tax revenues, TRH total government  transfers
to households, NG total current expenditure on goods and services,  and IFG
the interest rate on public foreign borrowing.  The last term on the right-hand
side measures  interest payments  on foreign loans.
Net government  saving  is  equal to  minus the overall government  budget
deficit,  -ODEF, and is  obtained  by adding  public investment  expenditure
to the current  fiscal deficit:
-ODEF =-CDEF-PQPZG,  (84)
where, given our assumption that only the private urban good is used for cap-
ital accumulation,  we  calculate  nominal  investment  outlays  by multiplying
ZG by the composite  price,  PQp.
Total  tax  revenues,  TXREV,  consist  of  revenue  generated  by  import
tariffs,  sales taxes, income taxes  (on both households  and firms in the urban
12It  should  be  noted  that  this  treatment  of public  investment  differs  from  standard
data classification  reported  in national accounts;  in many  instances  these investments are
classified  as current  expenditures.
42private  sector),  and payroll taxes:
TXREV  =  (WPMAANtmANMANER)  +  (wpmptmpMpER)  (85)
+  ,  indtaxiPXiXi + inCtaXKAPYHKAP
+inctaxr(YHAT + YHAN)  + inctaxuu(YHuF +  YHs)
+ptaxuWMUp + ptaxsWsSp + inctaXFPROFp.
Government  investment  is the sum of investment in infrastructure,  IINF,
investment  in  health,  IH,  and  investment  in education,  IE,  which  are  all
considered exogenous  policy variables:
ZG = IINF +  IE + IH-  (86)
Government  investment  increases  the  stock  of  public  capital  in  either
infrastructure,  education  or health.  The stock of public capital  in education
includes  items  such as school  buildings,  whereas  the stock of health capital
includes hospitals and the like.  Infrastructure capital includes all other stocks
of public property,  such as roads,  railroads, and power plants.  Accumulation
of each type of capital is defined  as:
Ki = Ki, 1 (1  - 6i) + Ii,-,,  where  i = INF, H, E,  and where 0 < bi  < 1,
(87)
where  0 <  6i < 1 is a depreciation  rate.
Infrastructure  and  health  capital  affect  the  production  process  in  the
private  sector  as  they  both  combine  to produce  the  stock  of government
capital,  KG:
KG  = CES(KINF, KH)  . (88)
Given the aggregate  saving-investment  balance  defined  earlier  (equation
(82)),  fiscal  balance  (ODEF = 0)  does  not  need to be  imposed  period  by
period;  all else equal,  a higher public  deficit  would translate  (all  else equal)
into  lower  private  investment.  However,  in simulations  where  the  deficit  is
held constant  (and normalized  at zero),  fiscal balance  is imposed  by solving
(83)  residually  for  NGC.
3.9  Balance  of Payments
The external constraint implies that any current account surplus  (or deficit)
must  be  compensated  by a net flow of foreign capital,  given by  the sum  of
43changes  in  foreign  loans  made to the  government,  AFLG,  and to  private
firms, AFLp:
0  =  (wpeiEi  - wpmiMA)  (89)
i
+REMIT - IF  FLP,-1- IFGFLG,- 1
+ZAFLG +  AFLp,
where the flow of remittances  is given by
REMIT = WFFORL-1,  (90)
with WF denoting again the foreign wage measured in foreign-currency  terms,
and FORL the stock of domestic workers  abroad, given by
FORL = (1  - 6IMIG)FORL-1 + IMIG,  (91)
where 0 < 
8 IMIG < 1 is the rate of "attrition"  of the stock of migrants.
In the simulations reported below, we assume that public foreign borrow-
ing is exogenous  in equation (89),  and that private foreign borrowing adjusts
to equilibrate  the balance of payments.  Equation (90) indicates that there is
a one-period  lag between changes  in the number of migrants abroad and the
flow of remittances.  In the simulations  reported  below,  official reserves  are
assumed to adjust to equilibrate  the balance of payments.
Walras' Law implies that one equilibrium condition  may be dropped,  be-
cause it will be automatically satisfied  if all the other equilibrium conditions
hold.  Instead of dropping  one  equation,  the  computer  program  checks  nu-
merically  for  continuous  equality  between savings  and investment,  as given
in (82).
Appendix C discusses the calibration of the model,  and our choice  of pa-
rameter values.  Essentially,  the model is calibrated using a social accounting
matrix,  which is described at length in Abdelkhalek  (2003).  Estimates of the
various  stock variables  appearing in the model (such  as the stock of private
capital,  and the stock  of public  capital  in infrastructure,  health and  educa-
tion), were obtained by using conventional perpetual inventory methods.  The
parameter  values that we have selected  are  taken as  much  as possible  from
the existing  literature  on Morocco  (such as  export  and import  elasticities)
but are also in part  "educated guesses,"  regarding  most notably the relative
importance  of skilled wages,  as opposed to skilled employment,  in the trade
44union's  utility function  (equation  (30)),  and the leadership  effect  of public
sector wages  in the union's target  wage  (equation  (31)).  These parameters
are obviously  important  in assessing the labor market  effects  of a variety of
policy  shocks.  Although  we limit  ourselves  below to presenting  a small  set
of experiments,  assessing the  sensitivity  of the results  to alternative  values
of these parameters,  as  well as various  others  for  which  guesses  need  to be
made, is essential to assess the robustness of the policy conclusions  that one
can draw from the model.
4  Policy  Experiments
As  noted  in  the  foregoing  discussion,  the  constraints  and  challenges  that
Morocco  faces  in  reforming  its  labor  market  are  the result  of a  variety  of
structural  factors,  including  the  demographic  structure  of  the  population,
the  lack  of sustained  rates  of economic  growth  (which  translate  into  weak
growth  in  labor  demand),  the high  degree  of vulnerability  of the  economy
to exogenous  shocks  (such as weather-related  shocks,  and the business  cycle
in industrial  countries),  and to the distortions  introduced  by existing  labor
market  regulations.  In a context of high  and persistent  unemployment,  we
argued  that  labor  market  reforms  should be  at the  forefront  of the  policy
agenda in Morocco.
Many economists have argued that reducing hiring and firing regulations,
restricting the scope of minimum  wages  (particularly  among the young and
unskilled),  reducing nonwage  labor costs  and payroll  taxes, and moderating
the influence of trade unions in the collective  bargaining  process  would im-
prove flexibility  and  have  a positive  effect  on  growth  and  the demand  for
labor,  thereby  reducing  unemployment.'3 The quantitative  framework  de-
scribed earlier  can indeed  be  used to provide  quantitative  estimates  of the
effects of these various labor market policies on resource allocation, the rate of
economic growth, and unemployment in Morocco.  Specifically,  we focus here
on the impact  of a reduction in the minimum wage (which is binding only for
1 3For  instance,  a study of  19  Latin  American  countries  by Rama  (1995)  showed  that
economies  with  more flexible  labor regimes  enjoy  higher  productivity  and faster  growth,
compared  to  those  with  a  rigid labor  code.  Others  have  argued  that  the  fairly  limited
impact  of trade  unions  and other  distortions  on  the labor  market was  an  essential  con-
tributing  factor  to the sustained  growth  rates achieved  in East  Asia prior  to the1997-98
crisis.
45unskilled workers in the urban informal economy),  and a reduction in payroll
taxes on unskilled  labor paid by urban  private sector  firms.  We  consider  a
non-neutral  shock in the second  case, that is, there is no offsetting change in
revenue,  and the government  borrows  domestically  to balance  its (current)
budget-implying  therefore  full  crowding  out  of private  investment,  as  im-
plied  by the  savings-investment  balance  (equation  (82)).  As  noted  below,
this  allows  us  to illustrate  the importance  of linking labor  market  reforms
and fiscal adjustment.
4.1  Cut in the Minimum Wage
The simulation results associated  with a permanent,  5  percent  reduction  in
the minimum wage  are illustrated in Tables  1 and  2, which display percent-
age  or absolute  changes  from the baseline  solution  for  a variety of sectoral,
macroeconomic,  and  structural  variables.  Public consumption,  investment,
and transfers to households  are kept constant,  whereas  taxes  adjust endoge-
nously to respond to fluctuations  in output, income, and spending on domes-
tic and foreign goods.
The impact effect of the reduction in the minimum wage is an increase in
the demand  for unskilled  labor in the private sector by about  3.7 percent  in
the first year.  This increase in demand is met by the existing pool of unskilled
workers  seeking  employment  in the urban sector.  As a result, the unskilled
unemployment rate drops significantly,  by about 2.4 percentage points in the
first  and subsequent years.
In the medium and longer term,  as the expected unskilled wage in the for-
mal economy  falls,  formal-informal,  rural-urban,  and domestic-international
migration  dynamics  set in.  First,  the increase  in private  formal  sector  em-
ployment  (at  the  initial  supply  of  unskilled  workers  in  the  formal  sector)
raises  the  probability  of finding  a job  in that  sector;  however,  this  is  not
sufficient  to  offset  the  reduction  in the  minimum  wage  itself,  and  the  ex-
pected formal sector wage  for unskilled workers  falls  (by about  2 percentage
points in the second year, for instance,  relative to the informal  sector wage).
This leads  to a reduction  in the number of workers  willing to queue for  em-
ployment  in the formal economy.  After  10  years,  the reduction  in unskilled
unemployment  is about  2.6 percentage  points,  slightly higher  than  the im-
pact effect.  The overall reduction in the number of unskilled workers  seeking
employment  in the formal  private  sector  is  accompanied  by  an  increase  in
labor  supply  in the  informal  economy,  which tends  to push wages down  in
46that sector.  However,  at the same time, the expected  urban-rural wage falls,
thereby  reducing  migration  flows to urban areas  and the supply of labor in
the  informal  sector.  The net  effect  is  indeed  a reduction  in the  supply  of
workers  in the informal economy  (with employment falling by about 0.5 per-
cent in period 3,  1.1 percent in period 5, and  1.7 percent  in periods  8 to 10),
which tends to put upward pressure  on informal sector wages.  This tends to
further  dampen the incentive to queue for employment in the formal private
sector.  But overall,  both employment  and activity  fall in the informal  sec-
tor,  with real value  added dropping  by 0.14 percent  in the long run.  At the
same  time,  the reduction  in rural-to-urban  migration  flows  is  accompanied
by lower wages,  higher employment,  and higher output in agriculture  in the
longer  run, with real value  added in both the traded  and nontraded sectors
increasing  by about  0.1  percent  after  10 years.
The initial reduction in the expected  unskilled urban wage relative to the
foreign wage increases  incentives  to migrate abroad;  but due to the parame-
ters of the model (the wage elasticity of these flows is assumed to be relatively
small,  and there is a high degree of persistence)  international migration flows
fall by only a small amount  (when measured in proportion of the total urban
unskilled  labor force).  The increase  in the number  of international migrants
means also a reduction in the domestic supply of unskilled labor,  which exerts
upward  pressure on informal sector  wages,  thereby mitigating the initial  ef-
fects on migration.  Over  time, because real informal sector wages (measured
in the  price of the urban  consumption  basket)  tend  to increase,  whereas  at
the same time the real wage in agriculture  tends to fall, migration flows from
rural to urban areas tend to fall  as well,  as noted earlier.
The  reduction  in the  minimum  wage,  by  reducing  the  relative  cost  of
unskilled  labor,  also  leads  to  some  substitution  among  production  factors
over time.  Because unskilled labor has a relatively high degree of substitution
with respect to the composite  factor  consisting of skilled labor and physical
capital  (both  public  and private),  the  lower  cost  of that  category  of labor
gives  indeed an incentive to firms to substitute  away from the skilled  labor-
physical  capital  bundle.  However,  this effect  is  not  large,  despite  the fact
that the skilled wage rises slightly after period 3,  as a result  of an increase in
the price of the consumption basket of the skilled household  (see Table 2),  as
implied by (31).  In fact, the supply of skilled labor barely changes during the
simulation  period,  given  that the public  stock  of capital  in education,  and
the number of teachers,  are both exogenous.  However, because of the overall
effect  of  output  growth  on  labor  demand  (real  value  added  in  the urban
47formal  sector  rises  over  time,  to  about  0.2  percent  in  periods  9  and  10),
skilled employment  tends to increase.  As a result, the skilled unemployment
rate also falls slightly over time.
The effect  on real GDP is  negligible  during the first  few years  but tends
to increase somewhat over time, as a result of the growth in real value added
in  agriculture  and  the  urban  formal  sector.  Aggregate  disposable  income,
and  private  consumption  and  investment  also tend  to  increase  during  the
simulation horizon.  Real  disposable income and private consumption  follow
a similar  pattern for  each  household  group,  except  for  unskilled  workers  in
the formal  urban sector.
Regarding the government budget, there are two effects to consider.  First,
the price of the consumption basket for the urban skilled and unskilled house-
holds  rises slightly  over  time  (as  a result  of an increase  in the demand  for
private  formal  goods),  the nominal  wage  at  which  the government  pays  its
workers increases  also slightly over time (see equations  (21)  and (28)).  Given
that employment  of both categories  of workers  is exogenous,  the wage bill in-
creases slightly (see Table 2), but this has no effect on the government  current
fiscal  balance,  as indicated  in equation  (83).  Second,  activity,  private  con-
sumption,  and imports tend to increase slightly over time, so that tax revenue
inreases  also.  Both consumption  and investment  spending fall  as  a propor-
tion of GDP, thereby reducing  borrowing from domestic agents.  Thus, given
the macroeconomic  "closure"  rule adopted here, the reduction in government
borrowing needs  exerts a  "crowding  in"  effect  on  private investment,  which
increases  in real  terms by  0.4  percent  after  10  years.  The  gradual  increase
in private  physical  capital  accumulation  has  both short-term  effects  (which
take the form of upward pressures on aggregate demand and prices) but also
longer-term,  supply-side  effects,  because it affects  the marginal productivity
of (and thus the demand  for)  all categories  of labor.
4.2  Reduction  in Payroll taxes on Unskilled  Labor
The simulation  results  associated  with a permanent,  5 percentage  point re-
duction  in the payroll tax rate on unskilled labor  are illustrated in Tables  3
and 4.  As indicated  earlier,  we assume that the shock is non-neutral,  imply-
ing that  domestic  borrowing  by the  government  may  exert  a full  crowding
out of private investment.
The impact  effect  of this  shock  is  qualitatively  similar  to  a cut  in the
minimum wage:  by reducing the effective  cost of unskilled  labor,  it tends to
48increase  immediately  the demand  for that category  of labor,  by almost  3.4
percent  in the first and subsequent three years.  The unskilled unemployment
rate  drops  by  2  percentage  points  on impact.  Over  time,  the  adjustment
process  of  the  labor  market  follows  the  same  type  of  dynamics  described
earlier,  except that now these dynamics operate  in reverse:  because the min-
imum  wage  does  not change,  and the probability  of employment  rises  (as  a
result of the initial effect  on labor  demand  of the tax cut on the  cost  of la-
bor),  the expected formal-to-informal  sector wage ratio for unskilled workers
increases, by about 4.1 percent  in period  2. This tends to draw labor out of
the informal sector, thereby leading to an increase in the number of unskilled
job  seekers  in the formal  sector.  At the same time,  the increase  in the  ex-
pected urban wage  draws labor out of the rural sector and into the informal
economy.  The net result  is  an increase  in informal sector  employment  and
a fall in informal sector wages.  The reduction in employment  in agriculture
also  leads to higher wages there.  The drop  in the expected  urban  unskilled
wage leads to a fall  in international  migration flows.
In the long term, real value added falls in all sectors-except the informal
economy,  which ends up absorbing part of the labor force that previously was
seeking employment  abroad.  The reason is that the increase  in government
borrowing  needs  due  initially  to  the  reduction  in the  payroll  tax tend  to
crowd  out  private  investment,  thereby  reducing  demand  for  formal  sector
goods  and activity  there.  This  tends to have  also  an adverse  effect  on tax
revenue over  time, thereby compounding the problem.  Indeed,  as the public
deficit  increases,  the rate  at  which  private  investment  falls  also  increases
over  time  (from -0.3  percent  in period  2  to -0.9  percent  in  period  5,  -1.9
percent  in period  8,  and  -3.0 percent  in period  10),  generating  therefore an
unsustainable  "downward"  spiral of low  activity,  low employment  and rising
deficits.  In  fact,  after  falling  initially  by  2  percentage  points  relative  to
its baseline  value,  the unskilled  unemployment  rate starts  increasing  again
as  a result  of the  reduction  in the  overall  demand  for  labor  in the formal
economy,  in  addition  to the  increase  in the  number  of job  seekers  in  the
formal economy-dropping  by only  1.2 percent  in period  10.  The reduction
in private investment  lowers  aggregate  demand, puts downward pressure  on
prices, and slows physical capital accumulation-thereby  reducing  growth in
the demand for  all categories  of labor over time.  Skilled employment  in the
private sector falls at an increasing rate over  time, due to its high degree  of
complementarity with physical  capital.
Thus,  this simulation illustrates  an important result-given  the link be-
49tween  government  borrowing  needs  and the private savings-investment  bal-
ance,  labor market  reforms  that entail  an initial adverse  effect  on the gov-
ernment  budget  may do more  harm than good  if they are not  accompanied
by adequate fiscal reforms.
5  Concluding Remarks
Reducing  unemployment  and  raising  the  rate of economic  growth  are  key
policy  challenges  in Morocco  today.  The  purpose of this paper has been  to
develop  a quantitative  framework  that allows  an  analysis  of the impact  of
a variety of macroeconomic  and structural  policies on  growth and the labor
market  in Morocco.  The first part of the paper provided  an overview of the
Moroccan  labor  market,  and  identified  some  of  the constraints  challenges
that the country will continue to face in the coming years.  The second part
presented  our  quantitative  framework,  which  captures  many  of the  char-
acteristics  of Morocco's  labor  market,  such  as  skilled  and unskilled  urban
unemployment,  the  existence  of firing  costs,  and  a signaling  role  of public
sector wages  on the union's target wage,  and payroll taxation in the private
urban  formal  sector.  The  extent to  which  high  payroll  taxes  have tended
to  discourage the  demand for  unskilled  labor  has been  an important  policy
issue in Morocco.  Our framework  allows us to consider how changes in these
taxes  affect employment  and wages, taking  into account their fiscal effects.
The third part of the paper  presented  simulation results  associated with
a cut in the minimum  wage and a reduction in payroll taxation on unskilled
labor,  under the  assumption that  government  domestic  borrowing exerts  a
full crowding out  on private  investment.  We showed that both policies  may
lead to a reduction in unskilled unemployment in the short term, and that the
process of adjustment of the labor market involves various types of dynamics,
rural to urban  migration,  formal-informal  adjustment  in labor  supply,  and
domestic-international  labor  flows.  However,  our  second  set  of  simulation
results  also  illustrates  the potential  problem  associated  with  labor  market
reforms-the  increase  in  government  borrowing  needs  due  initially  to  the
reduction  in  the  payroll  tax  was  shown  to  crowd  out  private  investment,
thereby reducing  demand  for  formal  sector goods,  activity,  and demand  for
both categories  of labor.  The fall in output tends also to reduce tax revenue,
thereby leading to an unsustainable increase in fiscal deficits over time.  Thus,
tax-based labor market reforms in Morocco may bring few benefits in the long
50run if they  are not  accompanied  by adequate fiscal  adjustment.
The  policy experiments  considered  here  could  be extended  in a  variety
of  directions.  For  instance,  one  could  consider  budget-neutral  changes  in
payroll  taxation  on  unskilled  labor  involving  adjustment  in income  taxes,
reductions in transfers,  or taxes on domestic  sales.  Although the qualitative
implications of these alternative budget closure rules may be similar to those
described earlier, the quantitative effects may differ significantly, particularly
on the composition  of employment  in the formal  sector.  In addition,  there
are  a  variety  of  other  labor  market  policies  that  can  be  analyzed  in  the
present  setting, such as the impact of reductions in firing costs,  public sector
layoffs  (possibly coupled with an increase in employment subsidies to private,
formal sector firms),  changes in trade  unions preferences between wages and
employment.  As noted earlier, firing costs have often been considered  to be a
major obstacle to labor market flexibility in Morocco (as well as in many other
countries),  because  by  constraining  the ability  of firms to react  to adverse
shocks, they lead them to restrain (permanent)  hiring in "good" times and to
rely more on casual or temporary  labor.  Another  important  policy exercise
would  be  to  examine  the  effects  of changes  in  the  composition  of  public
expenditure  (that  is,  the  allocation  between  investment  in  infrastructure,
education,  and health)  on growth and employment.
Although some  of these policy  experiments  would  be useful in designing
an appropriate  sequence of labor market reforms for Morocco, the key policy
message  of the simulations  reported  in this paper  is  likely to remain  valid:
labor  market reforms that entail  large fiscal effects  may not be sufficient,  by
themselves,  to  increase employment  durably.  They  need to be  seen  in the
context of a broader policy package  (involving most likely significant changes
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Variable Names  and Definitions
Endogenous  Variables15
CDEF  Current  public budget deficit
DP  Domestic  demand  for domestic private urban good
Ei  Export of traded goods for i = AT, P
Ewu  expected  urban unskilled wage
EWA  expected  agricultural wage
Ew5 expected skilled wage
fh  Firing cost per skilled worker for h  = S, U
FC  Total firing costs
FORL  Stock of domestic workers  abroad
Gi  Government spending on good i = AN, AT, G, P
IMIG  International migration
INTi  Intermediate good demand for good  i
KE  Public capital  in education
KG  Total public capital
KH  Public capital in health
KINF  Public capital in infrastructure
KP  Private capital
Mi  Import of good i = AN, P
MIG  Migration to urban area
ODEF  Overall budget deficit
PR  Rural price index
PDi  Domestic price of domestic sales of good i =  AN, P
PEi  Price  of exported good i = AT, P
PK  Price  of capital
PLEV  Overall consumer  price index
PMi  Price  of imported good i = AN, P
PQi  Composite  good price of good i
PROFi  Profits by firms in sector i = AN, AT, I, P
PT1 Price of composite  input T1
PT2 Price of composite  input T2
I5The index  i  (respectively,  h)  is  used below  to refer  to all production  sectors  (house-
hold  groups,  respectively),  that  is, AN, AT, I, P,  G (AN, AT, R, KAP,  I, UU, UF,  S,  re-
spectively),  unless otherwise indicated.
59Ph  Price index for household  h = US, UU
PVi  Value  added price of good i
PXi  Sales price of good i
Qs, Qq&  Composite supply and demand of good i
REMIT  Foreign-currency  value of the flow of remittances from
abroad
S  Skilled workers
Sp  Skilled workers  in private urban formal sector
Sdp  Demand for skilled workers in private urban formal sector
SpT  Union's employment target
SAVh  Saving by household  h.
Savrateh  Saving rate for household  h
SKL  New skilled workers
Sp  Skilled labor  employed in private urban formal
T1 Composite input from T2 and unskilled labor
T2  Composite input from capital and skilled labor
TRH  Transfers to households
TXREV  Tax revenues
Ui  Unskilled labor employed  in sector i = AN, AT, I, P
UR  Unskilled  workers in rural economy
Uu  Unskilled  workers in urban economy
Uid  Demand  for labor in sector i = AN, AT, I, P
UFS  Unskilled labor supply in the urban formal sector
uIS  Unskilled  labor supply in the informal  sector
UNEMPS  Skilled unemployment  rate
UNEMPU  Unskilled  unemployment  rate in the formal sector
Vi  Value  added in sector i
1'V,  Nominal  wage for labor  employed in sector  i = A, I
Uni  Real wage rate for unskilled  labor employed  in
sector i = AN, I
WM  Minimum  wage (unskilled  labor in urban formal private
sector)
WM  Real minimum wage  (unskilled workers  in urban formal
private sector)
Ws  Nominal wage rate for skilled worker  in the private urban
formal sector
60WS  Real  wage rate for skilled worker in the private urban
formal sector
WsC  Consumption real wage for  skilled labor
w CT  Union's consumption  real wage for skilled labor
WSG  Nominal wage rate for skilled labor in the government  sector
WSG  Skilled wages in the public sector measured  in terms of
the relevant price index
WUG  Nominal wage rate for unskilled  labor in the government  sector
WUG  Unskilled wages  in the public sector measured  in terms of
the relevant  price index
Xih  Subsistence  level of consumption  of good i by household  h
Xi  Production of good i
YFi  Income by firms in sector i = AN, AT, I, P
YHh  Household  income for household  h
Zi  Investment  demand for good i = G, P
Zp  Investment  demand for good i = P, G by formal private  sector
61Exogenous  Variables
Name  Definition
aci  Share of autonomous consumption of good i in total
consumption of good i
ER  Nominal exchange  rate
EWF  Expected foreign wage measured  in terms of the domestic
price index
FLi  Foreign  loans to sector  i = G, P
Gc  Government  consumption
gR  Population  growth in rural economy
gu  Population growth in urban economy
IE  Real public investment  in education
IF  Foreign interest rate
IF0 Interest  rate on government  foreign loans
IH  Real public investment in health
IINF  Real public investment  in infrastructure
inctaXh  Income  tax rate for h
indtaxi  Rate  of indirect taxation of output  in sector  i
LANi  Land  used by sector i = AN, AT
NG  Total government  current expenditure  on goods and services
ptaxs  Payroll tax for skilled labor in private urban sector
ptaxu  Payroll tax for unskilled  labor in private urban sector
SG  Skilled workers in public sector
tmj  Import tariff for  good i = AN, P
UG  Unskilled  workers in public sector
WF  Nominal  foreign wage
WsG  Real wage rate paid to skilled workers in public sector
wpei  World price of export  for i = AT, P
wpmi  World price of import  for i = AN, P
62Parameters
Name  Definition
a,,j  Input-output  coefficient  for i = AN, AT, I, P, G and
j = AN,AT,J,P,G
aXTP  Shift parameter in transformation  function
between  exported and domestic private production
axi  Shift parameter  in production of good i = AN, AT, I, P
(Xpi  Shift parameter  in composite input of unskilled
and skilled/capital  composite input
aXP2  Shift parameter  in composite  input of skilled workers  and private
capital
1F  Speed  of adjustment  for the supply of unskilled  labor in
the formal private sector
OQA  Shift parameter  in agricultural  composite good
(QP  Shift parameter  in urban composite  good
ITP  Shift parameter  between  exported and  domestic private
production
/xi  Shift parameter  in production of good i = AN, AT, I, P
xpU1 Share parameter  between unskilled  and skilled/capital
composite input
/
3XP2  Share parameter  between  skilled workers  and private capital
IhF  Money demand elasticity  on foreign rate
IhPINF  Money demand elasticity on inflation
ccih  Shares  of household  h in consumption of good  i
dcop  Parameter  in the value function  of urban private formal goods
bE  Depreciation  of education capital
6H  Depreciation  of health capital
6INF  Depreciation  of infrastructure
eIMIG  Rate  of "attrition"  of the stock of migrants
bp  Private  capital's  depreciation rate
Es  Rate of "depreciation"  or"de-skilling"  of the skilled labor
7XAN  Coefficient  of returns to  scale
7XAT  Coefficient  of returns to  scale
alh  Share  of transfers allocated to household h = KAP, AN,
S,AT,UF,I
ggi  Share of government  expenditure  on good i = AN, AT, G, P
63indm  Parameter  indexing nominal  wage for  unskilled  labor employed
in private urban  formal
indsG  Parameter indexing  nominal wage for skilled  workers in
public sector
induc  Parameter  indexing nominal wage for  unskilled workers  in
public sector
/Sse  Shift parameter  in skills acquisition  function
KSs  Shift parameter  for skilled private sector employment
Aim  Speed  of adjustment  in the international  migration equation
Am  Partial adjustment rate  on migration
A,  Partial adjustment  rate on skills  acquisition
oj  Parameters determining  the nominal wage rate for  the skilled
labor for j  =  1,2, 3
re  Percentage  of profits retained
PTP  Substitution parameter between  exported  and domestic private
production
Pxi  Substitution parameter  in production of good i = AN, AT, P
PxP1  Substitution  parameter between  unskilled  and
skilled/capital  composite input
PXP2  Substitution parameter  between skilled workers  and private
capital
(Je  Parameter  in the skill equation
aim  Partial elasticity  of migration  flows with respect  to expected
wages
Oliu  Partial elasticity of migration  flows with respect to unskilled
unemployment
UQA  Elasticity  of agricultural  composite  good
'QP  Elasticity  of private urban composite good
crS  Elasticity  of saving rate to deposit rate
0 TP  Elasticity of transformation between  exported  and domestic
private production
U W  Elasticity  of skills  acquisition  to wage differential
UXP1  Elasticity  of substitution  between  unskilled  workers
and composite  input  of skilled workers and  private capital
O-XP2  Elasticity  of substitution  between  skilled workers and private
capital
64j  RFraction of the remittances that are allocated to households in
the informal sector
ou  Share of urban unskilled workers  employed in formal sector
0.  Initial ratio of the number of workers employed in the private
sector
v  Relative  importance that the union attach to wage deviations
as opposed to employment  deviations
wr,  Relative  weight  of good i in rural consumption
wsi  Initial share of good i in skilled workers'  consumption
wui  Initial share of good i in urban unskilled workers'  consumption
zz,  Share of investment  expenditure on good i = G, P
65Appendix  C
Calibration and Parameter Values
This Appendix presents a brief overview  of the characteristics  of the data
underlying  the  model's  social  accounting  matrix  (SAM)  and discusses  the
parameter values."6
The basic data set consists of a SAM  and a set of initial levels and lagged
variables.  The SAM  encompasses  27 accounts  including  production  and re-
tail sectors  (4  accounts),  labor  production  factors  and profits  (3 accounts),
enterprises  (1 account),  households  (5 accounts),  government  current  expen-
ditures and  taxes  (9  accounts),  government  investment  expenditures  (3  ac-
counts),  private  investment  expenditures  (1 account),  and  the rest  of the
world  (1 account).  The  actual SAM data are presented in Table Cl.
The characteristics  of the SAM data are summarized  in the following.  On
the output side,  agricultural  and informal sectors are very small accounting
for respectively  3 and  11  percent  of total output.  In contrast,  private urban
formal  production  account  for  almost  75  percent  of total output.  On  the
demand  side,  private  current  expenditures  account  for  68  percent  of  GDP,
while  government  current  expenditures  account  for  15  percent  of GDP.  At
the same  time, total  investment expenditures  represent  25 percent  of GDP,
implying that  Morocco  is  running  a trade  deficit  equivalent  to  8 percent  of
GDP.
Looking  at the balance of payments, total net remittances to households
and net factor  income to enterprises  amounts to 2 percent  of GDP. The en-
suing  current  account  deficit,  amounting  to  6  percent  of GDP,  is  financed
equally by private and public foreign borrowing.  The trade balance are dom-
inated by non-agricultural imports and exports - agricultural exports account
for  only  14 percent  of total export earnings,  while  non-agricultural  imports
account for 95 percent of total import expenditures.  The level of trade open-
ness,  measured  by  the  ratio  of the  sum  of imports  and  exports  to  GDP,
amounts to a moderate  44  percent.
Looking at the government  budget,  indirect  taxes in the form of produc-
tion and retail level taxes account for 62 percent of total government revenues
excluding  inter-government  transfers.  Enterprise tax revenues, amounting to
16The first part of this Appendix draws heavily on an unpublished  note by Dr.  Touhami,
who  built the SAM  that  we use for  calibrating  our  model.  A comprehensive  description
of the SAM is available  in Touhami  (2003).
6618  percent  of total government  income,  represents the  largest  revenue item
among direct tax items, while combined factor  and household  taxes account
for only  12  percent  of revenues.  Foreign borrowing  accounts for the remain-
ing 8 percent of government revenues.  On the expenditure side, domestic and
foreign transfers account for respectively  8 and 9 percent of the budget, while
consumption  and savings for investment purposes  amount to respectively  40
and 42 percent of the budget.  Overall, the Moroccan government  relies heav-
ily on  indirect taxes  for  revenue  collection,  while maintaining  almost equal
proportions  between  consumption  and saving for investment  purposes.
Consider now the behavioral parameters.  The elasticity of substitution of
the public  capital  stock with the private capital-skilled  labor bundle in the
production  of the private  good,  uxp,  is  set to zero,  implying  perfect  com-
plementary.  The elasticities  of substitution  of public  capital with unskilled
labor in production of agricultural goods, cTXAN  and cYXAT,  are both equal to
0.75.  The elasticity  of substitution between  unskilled labor and the capital-
skilled labor bundle in the private formal sector,  oJxpl,  is  0.7.  The elasticity
of substitution  between skilled  labor  and private  capital,  OJXP2,  is  0.3.  The
Armington elasticities,  PQA  and pQp,  are taken to be 0.25  and zero  respec-
tively.  cYQA  and  cQp  are  0.8  and  1 respectively.  The  CET  transformation
elasticity, 
7 TP,  is  1, and the  export  demand  elasticity, 
7TP,  is  also  1.  The
depreciation  rate of private capital,  Sp,  is  0.08.  The congestion  effect on the
use  of public  goods  in production,  dcop,  is  zero.  Nominal  wages  are  fully
indexed  on the relevant  price  index.  The elasticity  of the skilled  wage  with
respect to unemployment,  01,  and with  respect to firing  costs,  02,  are both
equal  to 0.1,  whereas  the elasticity  with respect  to the public  sector  wage,
3, is  0.5.  The relative weight  of wages in the trade union's utility function,
v, is  0.1,  which indicates that the union  cares more about employment than
wages.  The weight  of relative  wages  in the  migration equation,  Am,  is  0.3.
The elasticity  of  migration  with  respect  to the  expected  wage  differential,
Cm)  is  0.1.  The degree  of persistence  in international  migration  flows,  Aim,
is 0.1.  The elasticity of international migration with respect  to the expected
wage differential,  aim, is 0.1.  The adjustment  coefficient  on skills acquisition,
A,, is  0.1.  The impact  of relative wages  on skills acquisition,  au,,  is 0.5.  The
elasticity  of skills  acquisition with  respect  to the public capital stock in ed-
ucation,  UE,  iS  0.8273.  The  degree  of persistence  of migration  flows to the
formal sector,  1F, is  0.1.  The elasticity  of substitution  between  infrastruc-
ture capital and health,  o-G,  is equal to 0.75.  The initial share parameter  for
the infrastructure  component,  /G,  is  0.75.
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71Figure 2
Morocco: Labor Market and Poverty Indicators,  1981-2000
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72Figure 3
Morocco: Labor Market and Poverty Indicators,  1982-2000
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Morocco:  Gross Labor Inflows to Selected European Countries,  1990-99
(in  thousands)
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Morocco: Gross Labor Outflows to Selected  European  Countries,  1990-99  1/
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Morocco: Worker Remittances from Abroad,  1990-2001
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76Figure 7. Morocco Model: Analytical Structure
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Roal SIeam
Totl1r.--ax  0  03  0  01  .0  02  .0.016  .0  11  .0 10  .019  .0 23  .026  .0 28
Gr  omdesticpWudcl  0  03  0.01  .0  02  .0  06  .0.10  .0.10  .0  10  .022  .0 25  .0 28
ln.pons of goo  ade.NF0  0  03  0  02  .0.02  .007  .0.12  .017  .0.21  .0.20  .027  .0.30
Tol11..pardtun,~  0,03  0 01  .0.02  .0.06  .0.11  .0.10  -0.19  .0.23  .0.20  .0 27
Totf of  tsnv1mptn  006  004  0.02  .0  02  .0.06  .0.10  .0.13  .0 15  .016  .017
P..  -onVtn.p0  0  07  0 00  0,02  .0  02  .0.07  .012  .0 i0  .010  .0.20  .021
Public  oonsurnotio  0  00  000  000D  0,00  0  00  0.00  0.00  0  00  0  00  0,00
Total  ImMstmoel  .0.07  .0.10  .0.14  .0.21  .0 28  .0 30  .043  .050o  .057  .0 64
p61,Mle 011611  .022  .0 31  .047  .0609  .0 97  .1.27  .109  .1005  .2 36  .2008
PnbOlc  rmastmlent  0 00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  00  0  00  0  00  000  0.00  900
Exports  ofgood. and NFS  6  03  0  02  .0.02  .0.07  .0 12  .017  .021  .0  25  .0 27  .0.30
E,t.rno  Seame  1%  of GOP)'
C,urrnt  oooImW  0,00  0 00  0  01  0.01  0.02  0  02  0  03  0  02  0  02  0  01
Exports  ofgood.and NFS  0 00  0 00  0.00  0.00  0  00  0  00  .0 01  .001  .0 02  .0 02
Imports  of goDd end  NFS  000  0  00  0  00  0.00  0  00  .0 01  .0 01  .0 01  .001i  .0 01
F.ctO,,mL-N  0  00  0  00  0.00  .0.01  .0 02  .0 02  .0 02  .0.03  .0 02  .0 02
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Pn.-0o  loo-fng  000  0.00  0  00  000o  0  00  0  00  0  01  0.01  0 01  001
Pkbob0OO  g01  0  00  0  00  0.00  0.00  0  01  0.01  0  02  0  02  0.02  0  02
G.--feofl  Se.ter I% of GDP)'
Toti  e."o  .0  04  .0 06  .0  03  .0 03  .0 03  .003  .0 03  .0 04  .0 04  .0 00
DdenSlsn.  0.00  0  01  0  01  0  01  0  01  001  0  01  001  0  01  0  00
Indinad W.r  .0  04  .0  04  .0  04  .0 04  .0.04  0.0,4  .0 00  .0,00  .0.05  .0 00
ToI exopenditure  .001  .0.01  0  01  0  02  004  0.06  0.07  0.00  010  0  11
Con-eorp.a  0.00  0  00  0  00  0  01  0  02  0.02  0.03  004  0  00  0  00
1nast~td  .0  01  0  00  0.00  0.01  0  02  002  0  03  0.04  0  00  0  00
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Foreig-d-t  tpayments  0,00  0  00  0  00  0.00  0  00  000D  0  00  0  00  000D  0.00
ToIWf1100nd,  002  0.02  0.04  0.06  000  0  10  0  12  014  016e  0.16
Forognfsntnedng  0  00  0  00  0.00  0  00  0  01  0  01  002  0  02  0  02  0.02
Dom1estic  b01w1l1  002  0  02  0  04  0  00  0  07  0  00  0  10  0 12  0  13  010s
Labor  Ma.rket
Ndornine  16g56
Agdutralokn1640  0  00  OIl  0.22  0  30  040  000o  0064  0.60  060o  0.01
Informal .Oo,  0  00  0.,47  1.122  .2.06  .2.88  .3.57  .4.05  .4.20  .4 25  .4 00
Pmnit. farriersnot.r
UnekIle  .0  01  .0.02  .0  03  .0.00  .0 07  .0 00  .0  10  .0  06  .0 07  .0 04
SkOad  0  00  .0.01  .0.04  0.0.7  .0.10  0.012  .0.14  .0.14  .0 14  .0 12
Public  sect,
Unskilled  .001  .0.02  .0.03  .0  00  .0 07  .0 Dg  .010  .0 00  .007  .0.04
Skited  .0.01  .0.02  .0  03  .0  00  .0 07  .0.60  .0  00  .0  00  .0.07  .0O04
Em,ployment
Agriouffr,M  eetIo
Traded  .0.02  .007  .0.17  .0.28  .0.39  .0.49  .06W  .0 60  .0 60  .0608
Non4t540d  050  0.04  .0.04  .0.13  .0.24  .0.35  .0  48  .0 50  .0 60  .0  76
,41.1mmet  "a  0.00  0  42  1.00  I0W  2  61  3  22  3607  3.87  3.02  3005
P-N,  ts  101  sector
Unokilid  3.36  3.250  3  22  0,30  3.26  3.22  31le  3.13  3  00  3  02
Sk41.4  0.02  0  01  0  00  .0 03  .0,06  .0 09  .0  14  .0 15  .0.25  .0.33
Pe1b11  seCor
UnSkWod  0  00  000  0,00  0.00  0  00  0.00  060  0 00  0.00  0.00
Sk,164  0.00  000  0.00  0  00  0.00  000  000  0 00  0  00  0.00
Labor .. pply (uOOn  formsa)
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